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Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Religious Freedom Cases 
Luke W. Goodrich* & Rachel N. Busick** 
This Article presents one of the first empirical studies of federal 
religious freedom cases since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Hobby Lobby.  Critics of Hobby Lobby predicted that it would open the 
floodgates to a host of novel claims, transforming “religious freedom” from 
a shield for protecting religious minorities into a sword for imposing 
Christian values in the areas of abortion, contraception, and gay rights. 
Our study finds that this prediction is unsupported.  Instead, we find 
that religious freedom cases remain scarce.  Successful cases are even 
scarcer.  Religious minorities remain significantly overrepresented in 
religious freedom cases; Christians remain significantly underrepresented.  
And while there was an uptick of litigation over the Affordable Care Act’s 
contraception mandate—culminating in Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of 
the Poor—those cases have subsided, and no similar cases have 
materialized.  Courts continue to weed out weak or insincere religious 
freedom claims; if anything, religious freedom protections are 
underenforced. 
Our study also highlights three important doctrinal developments in 
religious freedom jurisprudence.  The first is a new circuit split over the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The second is confusion over the 
relationship between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that is 
currently plaguing litigation over President Trump’s travel ban.  The third 
is a new path forward for the Supreme Court’s muddled Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the old days, religious liberty was mainly about protecting religious 
minorities—Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Amish, Native Americans, and 
others who were overlooked by an insensitive majority.  Today, religious 
liberty is mainly about sex—especially Christians who object to abortion, 
contraception, and gay rights.  Laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) and cases like Hobby Lobby1 and the Little Sisters of the Poor2 
have emboldened the Christian majority to wield “religious liberty” as a 
sword to take away other people’s rights, rather than a shield to protect 
 
 1  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2  Zubik v. Burwell (Little Sisters of the Poor), 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).   
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religious minorities.  And the courts are now being flooded with cases 
involving Christians who object to selling flowers, cakes, or photography 
services for same-sex weddings. 
At least this is a common narrative in the media and some corners of 
academia.3  But is it accurate? 
We wanted to answer this question empirically.  So we chose the home 
of Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor—the Tenth Circuit—and, 
beginning with a database of over 10,000 decisions, examined every 
religious freedom decision within that Circuit over the last five (and in some 
cases ten) years.  We first presented our findings to over 100 federal judges 
at the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference in May 2017.  We now expand on 
those findings in this Article—one of the first empirical studies of the federal 
“religious liberty docket” since Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor.4 
 
 3  See, e.g., Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A 
Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 929–30 (2016) (“Hobby Lobby 
redesigned the terrain for free exercise claims” and “opened the door for increased demands 
from private entities for [religious] accommodations or exemptions . . . with little regard to 
the problems of attenuation and harm to third parties.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Hobby Lobby 
Has Opened a Minefield of Extreme Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015, 1:24 PM), 
https://nyti.ms/2vKAjuA (arguing that RFRA is “unconstitutional, unprincipled[,] and a 
sword believers gladly wield against nonbelievers”); Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can 
No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), 
http://wapo.st/1e6WIWI?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.c81f54e607e5 (“While the RFRA may serve 
as a shield to protect [religious minorities], it is now often used as a sword to discriminate 
against women, gay and transgender people and others.”).   
 4  Several groundbreaking empirical studies predate Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of 
the Poor and focus on the religious affiliation of judges or claimants.  See Gregory C. Sisk, 
Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An 
Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004) [hereinafter 
Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking]; Gregory C. Sisk, 
How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from 
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk, How Traditional 
and Minority Religions Fair in the Courts]; Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and 
the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
873 (2008); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision 
Making: An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael 
Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions 
in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2012) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Ideology 
“All the Way Down”?]; Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before 
the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371 
(2013); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: 
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012) [hereinafter Heise 
& Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty].   
  Others have examined the success rates of free exercise or RFRA claims before Hobby 
Lobby.  See Amy Adamczyk, John Wibraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the 
Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE 237 (2004); 
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. 
REV. 466 (2010).  
  Three empirical studies postdate Hobby Lobby.  One examines the application of strict 
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What we found upends the common narrative.  Contrary to predictions 
that Hobby Lobby would open the floodgates of religious liberty litigation, 
these cases remain scarce, making up only 0.6% of the federal docket.  And 
contrary to predictions that religious people would be able to wield Hobby 
Lobby as a trump card, successful cases are even scarcer: there have been 
only five winning issues within the Tenth Circuit in five years (sharia, 
polygamy, eagle feathers, contraception, and the Ten Commandments).  
Moreover, despite claims that Christians would be the prime beneficiaries of 
Hobby Lobby, religious minorities are significantly overrepresented in the 
cases relative to their population, while Christians are significantly 
underrepresented.  And while there was an uptick of RFRA claims 
challenging the contraception mandate—culminating in Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor—those cases have subsided, and no similar cases 
have materialized.  Courts have had no problem weeding out weak or 
insincere RFRA claims.  If anything, RFRA has been underenforced.  There 
were no cases involving a clash between gay rights and religious liberty.5  
But there were interesting doctrinal developments under RFRA, the Free 
Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause that foreshadow potentially 
significant changes in religious liberty jurisprudence. 
We explore these findings in three parts.  After summarizing our 
methodology (Part I), we first examine the overall number and type of 
religious liberty decisions—the “religious liberty docket,” so to speak (Part 
II).  We find that religious liberty decisions are scarce, that half of all 
decisions involve prisoners or asylum seekers, and that the contraception 
mandate produced an anomalous spike in RFRA cases that has now subsided. 
 
 
scrutiny in free exercise cases from 1990 to 2015.  See Caleb C. Wolanek & Heidi Liu, 
Applying Strict Scrutiny: An Empirical Analysis of Free Exercise Cases, 78 MONT. L. REV. 
275 (2017).  Another examines the effect of judges’ religious affiliation in religious liberty 
cases.  See Sepehr Shahshahani & Lawrence J. Liu, Religion and Judging on the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 716 (2017).  The third examines religious 
exemption requests after Hobby Lobby and compares them with speech claims.  See Stephanie 
H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense 
of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079777 (November 30, 2017 draft).   
 5  In other jurisdictions, there have been religious liberty cases involving the application 
of antidiscrimination laws to individuals who religiously object to participating in a wedding 
ceremony or similarly expressive events.  See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111 (S. Ct.) (oral argument scheduled Dec. 5, 2017); 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 17-108 (S. Ct.) (cert petition pending); Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. 13-585 (S. Ct.) (cert denied); Lexington Fayette Urban 
Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745-MR, 2017 
WL 2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017).  But those cases have typically been brought in 
state court under state or local antidiscrimination laws.  There were no similar cases in any 
federal court within the Tenth Circuit during our five-year time period.   
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Next we examine the religious makeup of religious liberty claimants—
the “religious liberty demographic” (Part III).  We find that religious 
minorities bring a disproportionate share of claims, and that Christians 
remain statistically underrepresented despite the unusual spike in 
contraception mandate cases. 
Finally, we examine the success and failure of various types of religious 
liberty claims (Part IV).  We find that successful religious liberty claims are 
very rare, that courts have no trouble weeding out weak religious liberty 
claims (and may well be underenforcing religious liberty protections), and 
that religious liberty cases are more than ten times more likely than other 
cases to provoke a dissent.  We also highlight several doctrinal developments 
in the most interesting cases—such as a new circuit split over Native 
American use of eagle feathers; confusion over the relationship between the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that is currently infecting the 
litigation over President Trump’s travel ban; and a new path forward for the 
Supreme Court’s muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
Ultimately, this study shows that the state of religious liberty in the 
federal courts is far more interesting and nuanced than the conventional 
narrative would suggest.  Religious liberty cases are scarce and often 
difficult.  But they remain crucial for navigating the difficult boundary 
between church and state. 
I.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our data set consists of all religious liberty decisions within the Tenth 
Circuit over the last five years (2012–2017).6  We chose the Tenth Circuit in 
part because it has been the leading edge of the conflict over the 
contraception mandate—including the locus of the Hobby Lobby and Little 
Sisters of the Poor cases—and in part because one of us was asked to address 
religious freedom for an audience of Tenth Circuit federal judges.  Although 
the Tenth Circuit may not be perfectly representative of the federal courts,7 
 
 6  The exact dates are from February 25, 2012 to February 24, 2017, inclusive.  As 
discussed in Part II.D, infra, an additional five years of research was conducted for RFRA 
claims, providing a data set for RFRA claims from February 25, 2007 to February 24, 2017, 
inclusive.   
 7  Several features make the Tenth Circuit an attractive circuit to study.  First, during the 
relevant timeframe, the Tenth Circuit was closely balanced politically—with 47.4% of active 
judges appointed by Republican presidents and 52.6% of active judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents.  (We calculated this by tallying the total number of months served by 
active Republican appointees during our timeframe (314) versus the total number of months 
served by active Democratic appointees (349).)  We do not assume that political ideology 
plays a role in religious freedom cases, but some empirical studies have found that the party 
of the appointing judge is a statistically significant variable in some religious freedom cases.  
See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?, supra note 4.  Examining a circuit 
with an even balance of Republican and Democratic appointees would reduce any such effect.   
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its docket provides a broad cross section of cases, and the narrower data set 
allows us to take a deeper dive into some of the most difficult and interesting 
cases.  To weed out frivolous claims and non-precedential orders, we 
excluded unreported district court decisions, as other scholars have done in 
similar studies.8  But we included all reported district court decisions and all 
Tenth Circuit decisions (both reported and unreported). 
To compile this data set, we ran the following searches in Westlaw’s 
Tenth Circuit Federal Cases database: 
1. adv: “relig!” & DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered 
to include all reported decisions in the district courts and Tenth 
Circuit. 
2. adv: “relig!” & DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered 
to include all unreported decisions in the Tenth Circuit. 
This search yielded 378 results—213 reported decisions and 165 
unreported decisions.  We reviewed each decision to determine whether it 
involved at least one of the following types of religious liberty claims: 
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, Equal 
Protection Clause, RFRA, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA), Title VII, the ministerial exception, religious association, 
autonomy, and asylum. 
Of the original 378 decisions, 118 decisions—80 appellate court 
decisions and 38 district court decisions—involved at least one live religious 
liberty claim.9  We considered a religious liberty claim live if it had not 
already been resolved at an earlier stage of the case.  Thus, a decision that 
 
  Second, during the relevant timeframe, the Tenth Circuit had a fairly typical reversal 
rate in the U.S. Supreme Court of 64.7%.  (We calculated this by examining all reversals for 
October Terms 2012–2016 as tallied by SCOTUSblog. SCOTUSblog, Stat Pack Archive, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (2017).) The highest reversal rate was the 
Third Circuit, at 87.5%; the lowest was the First Circuit, at 50%; the average over all circuits 
was 71.6%.  Of course, the reversal rate for all cases does not tell us anything specific about 
religious freedom cases, but it is one indicator that the Tenth Circuit is average in its 
jurisprudence as a whole.   
  Third, the Tenth Circuit’s religious demographic is similar to the religious 
demographic of the nation as a whole—with a breakdown of 72% Christian, 3% other 
religions, and 23% unaffiliated in the Tenth Circuit, compared with 71% Christian, 2% other 
religions, and 23% unaffiliated in the nation as a whole.  See infra Table 8.   
  One difference between the Tenth Circuit and the nation as a whole is that the Tenth 
Circuit has a higher proportion of Native Americans and members of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) than does the nation as a whole.  Thus, we consider 
those demographic groups in greater detail in our findings below.   
 8  See Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 4, at 6 & n.7 (discussing reasons for excluding 
unreported decisions); Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial 
Decisionmaking, supra note 4, at 534–39 (same).   
 9  Of the 372 cases, 54 cases touched on religion-related issues, but did not include a 
religious claim, and 199 cases only mentioned “religion” or “religious” (or, as one mentioned, 
“relight”).   
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mentioned that a religious liberty claim had already been resolved earlier in 
the case was not included, but a decision that mentioned that the religious 
claim had not yet been resolved, even if the court ultimately ruled on a 
procedural issue or on the merits of another claim, was included.  These 118 
decisions compose our data set of religious liberty decisions.10 
We coded each decision separately, regardless of whether there were 
multiple decisions in the same case.  The reasons for this are twofold.  First, 
it allowed us to observe the relative frequency that various religious claims 
and religious claimants came before the federal courts, providing a more 
complete picture of litigation.  Second, it eliminated subjective judgment 
calls about how to code a case when there were multiple decisions over the 
life of a case (such as a decision on a request for preliminary injunction, an 
interlocutory appeal, and a subsequent ruling on remand) or when the same 
court issued more than one decision addressing different parts of the case or 
addressing the case in different procedural postures.11 
For each decision, we coded the following variables: 
 The court; 
 The date; 
 Whether the decision was reported or unreported; 
 Whether the Tenth Circuit decision was heard en banc; 
 Whether the Tenth Circuit decision was unanimous; 
 Whether the plaintiff was filing pro se; 
 Whether the religious claimant was an individual, prisoner, or 
organization; 
 What the religious affiliation of the religious claimant was, if 
known; 
 Whether the decision was an overall win or loss for the 
religious claimant; 
 
 10  We analyze this data set, as well as various subsets of it, throughout this Article.   
 11  An alternative approach would be to code only one decision from each “stage” of the 
litigation.  Cf. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking, 
supra note 4, at 552–53.  But this approach is not without its drawbacks.  Take, for example, 
a case where a court grants one group of plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against a 
regulation, Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (W.D. Okla. 2014), 
but later in the same case grants (or denies) another preliminary injunction to a broader group 
of plaintiffs against a different version of the regulation, Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. 
Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 126 (W.D. Okla. 2014).  It is not at all clear why either decision 
should be ignored when both decisions required the court to address the merits of slightly 
different religious freedom claims.  Thus, coding only one decision from each level of the 
litigation risks ignoring valuable information.  It also tends to downplay the extent to which 
certain types of claims consume more judicial resources (in the form of more decisions).  And 
it also leaves room for subjective judgments about which of multiple decisions to code.  In 
our data set, there were approximately five decisions (depending on one’s definition of a 
“stage”) that would be eliminated by coding only one decision per “stage.”   
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 What types of religious liberty claims were presented; 
 Whether each religious liberty claim was a win or loss; and 
 Whether each win or loss was based on the merits of the claim 
or on other grounds. 
We further explain our coding methodology at appropriate places in the 
analysis of our findings below. 
II.  NUMBER AND TYPE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMS 
A. Religious Liberty Cases are Relatively Scarce. 
We first wanted to determine how often religious liberty cases arise as 
a percentage of the federal courts’ docket.  To do this, we searched within 
our target dates for all cases of any kind (all Tenth Circuit decisions, and all 
reported district court decisions)—yielding a total of 10,025 cases.12  This 
means that the 118 religious liberty decisions during that time period 
constitute 1.2% of all decisions.  That figure is higher for the Tenth Circuit 
(1.3%) than for the district courts (1.0%).  This could suggest that religious 
liberty decisions are more likely than average to be appealed.  Alternatively, 
because our data set excludes unpublished district court decisions, it could 
mean that district courts resolve religious liberty cases more often using 
unpublished opinions.  More on this later.  Either way, the 1.2% of decisions 
involving any type of religious liberty claim suggests that religious liberty 
cases are a fairly small portion of the courts’ docket.13 
The paucity of religious liberty decisions is even more apparent when 
we consider the prevalence of decisions involving prisoners or asylum 
seekers.  Of the 118 religious liberty decisions in our data set, 39 (33%) 
involve cases brought by prisoners and 20 (17%) involve cases brought by 
individuals seeking asylum.  In other words, half of all religious liberty 
decisions involved prisoners or asylum seekers. 
 
 
 
 12  We searched all Tenth Circuit decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-
2017), yielding 6,131 cases.  We then searched each federal district court within the Tenth 
Circuit for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered to include only reported cases, 
yielding 3,894 cases—949 Colorado district court cases, 649 Kansas district court cases, 785 
New Mexico district court cases, 561 Oklahoma district court cases, 556 Utah district court 
cases, and 394 Wyoming district court cases.   
 13  Religious liberty cases are also scarce in comparison with other types of cases.  For 
example, one study of all federal cases during the three years post Hobby Lobby compared 
the volume of speech and expression cases to religious exercise cases, finding that speech and 
expression cases outnumber religious claims at a ratio of about 3:1.  See Barclay & Rienzi, 
supra note 4, at 55 Table 2; cf. id. at 57 Table 6 (Between 1946–2016, the United States 
Supreme Court has heard 344 speech and association cases compared to only 29 religious 
exercise cases.).   
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The vast majority of these cases were unsuccessful.  Of the 39 prisoner 
cases, 87% were pro se, 87% were unpublished, and 82% were 
unsuccessful.14  Prisoners tend to bring a high percentage of meritless claims, 
and the resolution of those claims often tells us little about federal religious 
liberty jurisprudence.  Thus, for the remainder of our analysis, we exclude 
prisoner cases unless otherwise noted.15 
The 20 asylum cases were also largely unsuccessful.  All of these cases 
were heard by the Tenth Circuit on direct appeals from the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) under a very deferential standard of review.  
Only one case resulted in a remand to the BIA—meaning that 95% were 
unsuccessful.  Thus, for similar reasons, we exclude these cases from our 
analysis unless otherwise noted.16 
Excluding the 59 decisions involving prisoners and asylum seekers 
leaves us with a revised data set of 59 religious liberty decisions—23 from 
the Tenth Circuit, and 36 from district courts.17  Obviously, these decisions 
make up an even smaller portion of the courts’ overall docket: 0.6% of all 
cases.18  But now, percentages for the Tenth Circuit and district courts are 
reversed: religious liberty decisions make up 0.4% of the Tenth Circuit’s 
docket and 0.9% of the district courts’ docket.  This suggests that, once we 
control for prisoner and asylum cases, religious freedom cases are not more 
likely to be appealed than other cases.  In fact, they may be less so. 
This also means that Tenth Circuit judges hear and decide religious 
liberty cases infrequently.  If we spread the 23 Tenth Circuit decisions across 
5 years, 12 active judges, and 7 senior judges, that would mean that a Tenth 
Circuit judge, on average, would sit on a panel producing a religious liberty 
 
 14  There were 7 prisoner decisions that included at least one successful religious claim: 
Robertson v. Biby, 647 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir. 2016) (free exercise); Williams v. Wilkinson, 
645 F. App’x 692 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA, free exercise, and equal protection); Woodstock 
v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) (RLUIPA and free exercise); Marshall v. 
Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., 592 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2014) (free exercise); Tennyson v. 
Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 
48 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); McKinley v. Maddox, 493 F. App’x 928 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(RLUIPA).  See infra Part IV.H.   
 15  For a fuller discussion of religious demographics in prisoner cases, see infra Part II.C.  
For a fuller discussion of success rates in prisoner cases, see infra Part IV.H.   
 16  For a fuller discussion of religious demographics in asylum cases, see infra Part II.D.  
For a fuller discussion of success rates in asylum cases, see infra Part IV.H.   
 17  Note that 57 out of the 59 decisions we are excluding came from the Tenth Circuit; 
only 2 came from the district courts.  The breakdown of the remaining district court decisions 
is as follows: 16 from the District of Colorado (43%); 5 from the Western District of 
Oklahoma (14%); 4 from the District of Kansas (11%); 4 from the District of New Mexico 
(11%); 4 from the District of Utah (11%); 3 from the District of Wyoming (8%); and 1 from 
the Northern District of Oklahoma (3%).   
 18  Excluding 59 prisoner and asylum decisions leaves us with 9,966 total decisions. 59 / 
9,966 = 0.006.   
GOODRICH BUSICK (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:13 PM 
362 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:353 
decision once every 13 months and would author a religious liberty decision 
once every 40 months.19 
B. The Most Common Claims are RFRA, Free Exercise,  
Establishment, and Title VII. 
When the courts do eventually decide a religious liberty case, what 
types of claims do they resolve?  As noted above, half of all religious liberty 
decisions involve prisoners or asylum seekers.  Prisoners typically raise 
claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.  
Asylum seekers invoke the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 
But what about the other half of decisions?  Table 1 displays a 
breakdown of the types of claims raised in the remaining 59 decisions.  
(Because most decisions involve more than one type of claim, the numbers 
and percentages add up to more than 59 and 100%, respectively.)20 
 
 
 
 
 19  As of early 2017, there were 12 active judges and 7 senior judges on the Tenth Circuit.  
Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, TENTH CIRCUIT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/list-tenth-circuit-judges.  Assuming a senior judge carries 
one-half of an active case load, we get the following: 23 decisions * 3 judges per panel / 5 
years / 15.5 judges = 0.890 religious liberty panels per judge per year, or 1 panel every 13.5 
months (12/0.890).  Assuming a judge authors a decision in one third of her panels, this yields 
1 decision every 40.4 months.  We have not accounted for separate opinions (like 
concurrences or dissents) or en banc proceedings, which would alter the numbers very slightly 
toward greater frequency.  During the five years we analyzed, there was one en banc decision 
and two decisions involving dissents from denial of rehearing en banc.  See Felix v. City of 
Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc); Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2015) (dissent 
from denial of rehearing en banc); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (en banc).   
  Justice Neil M. Gorsuch sat on the Tenth Circuit for over ten years, including the entire 
time covered by our data set. U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
NOMINEE TO THE SUPREME COURT: JUDGE NEIL M. GORSUCH 2, 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch%20SJQ%20(Pub
lic).pdf.  During his tenure, he heard over 2,700 cases, of which 40 (1.5%) touched on 
religious liberty.  Id. at 25, 30–32; Hearing on the Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. 
Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) (written testimony of Hannah C. 
Smith, Senior Counsel, Becket).  Of those 40, there were 11 opinions that involved the same 
religious claims we looked at and did not involve prisoners or asylum seekers—i.e., 0.4% of 
his docket as a whole.  This is the same percentage we found during our time period for the 
Tenth Circuit as a whole.  It means that Judge Gorsuch participated in roughly one religious 
liberty decision per year.   
 20  All percentages are rounded to the nearest full percent.  Tables that include decimals 
use up to two significant digits.   
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Table 1. Types of Religious Liberty Claims 
Type of Claim No. Percentage 
RFRA 23 39% 
Free Exercise Clause 22 37% 
Establishment Clause 19 32% 
Title VII 17 29% 
Free Speech Clause 12 20% 
Equal Protection Clause 7 12% 
Religious Association 4 7% 
RLUIPA 1 2% 
Autonomy 0 0% 
Ministerial Exception 0 0% 
 
RFRA and free exercise claims are the most common.  RFRA claims 
are examined in detail in the next section.  RFRA and free exercise are 
followed closely by claims under the Establishment Clause and Title VII, 
and then more distantly by free speech.  There are only a few claims 
involving equal protection, religious association, or RLUIPA. 
Interestingly, there are no decisions involving land-use claims under 
RLUIPA.  That does not mean these claims never arise, only that they arise 
infrequently and not recently.21  Some commentators have criticized 
RLUIPA, arguing that it gives religious organizations a “blank check” to 
challenge local zoning laws and makes it virtually impossible for local 
zoning authorities to defend themselves.22  Others (including one of us) have 
argued that RLUIPA is modest and underenforced.23  The absence of any 
RLUIPA land-use decisions in the last five years would seem to support the 
latter. 
Also interesting is that there have been no ministerial exception cases 
in the last five years.  The ministerial exception is a constitutional doctrine 
that has long barred certain types of employees (those performing important 
religious functions) from suing their religious employer on certain types of 
claims (those that would entangle the courts in religious questions or impose 
an unwanted leader on a religious organization).  In 2012, at the beginning 
 
 21  There have only been a few RLUIPA land-use cases in the Tenth Circuit.  See, e.g., 
Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006); Grace 
Church of Roaring Fork Valley v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Pitkin Cty., Colo., 742 F. Supp. 2d 
1156 (D. Colo. 2010).   
 22  See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The Circus That Is RLUIPA: How the Land-Use Law that 
Favors Religious Landowners Is Introducing Chaos into the Local Land Use Process, 
FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2006), http:// writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20061130.html.   
 23  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and 
Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021 (2012).   
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of our data set, the Supreme Court decided its first ministerial exception case, 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.24  At 
the time, the federal government argued that ruling in favor of the church 
would create a slippery slope allowing churches to assert a ministerial 
exception defense to all sorts of claims in all sorts of circumstances.25  After 
the Court ruled unanimously for the church, some commentators criticized 
the decision on similar grounds.26  But that slippery slope has not 
materialized in the Tenth Circuit.  Although courts within the Tenth Circuit 
issued four ministerial exception decisions in the ten years before Hosanna-
Tabor,27 they have decided none in the five years since. 
C. There was a Spike in RFRA Claims Against the Contraception 
Mandate. 
Because the most common type of religious liberty claim was based on 
RFRA, a closer look at RFRA decisions is warranted.  Of the 59 decisions 
not involving prisoners or asylum seekers, 23 involved a RFRA claim.28  Of 
these, 18 (78%) involved the contraception mandate—a federal regulation 
requiring employers to cover contraception in their health insurance plan.29  
Three (13%) involved Native American access to eagle feathers.30  One (4%) 
involved a pro se challenge to the classification of marijuana as a Schedule 
 
 24  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  Co-author Goodrich was co-counsel for the church in Hosanna-
Tabor.   
 25  Brief for the Federal Respondent at 44–46, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) 
(No. 10-553).   
 26  See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin, The 
Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013); Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even 
More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 19 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400 (2012).   
 27  A search for lower court decisions in the Tenth Circuit that mention “ministerial 
exception,” excluding unreported district court decisions, reveals four ministerial exception 
decisions in the ten years preceding Hosanna-Tabor: Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 
289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Braun v. St. Pius X Par., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (N.D. Okla. 
2011); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004).   
 28  None of the 39 decisions in prisoner cases or 20 decisions in asylum cases involved a 
RFRA claim.   
 29  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (requiring all group health plans and health insurance 
issuers that offer non-grandfathered health coverage to provide coverage for certain 
preventive services without cost-sharing, including, “[for] women, such additional preventive 
care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration”).   
 30 U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (RFRA defense to killing an eagle 
and possessing eagle parts); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. 
Okla. 2016) (state RFRA claim seeking permission to wear eagle feather at graduation); N. 
Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (RFRA challenge to 
government refusal to permit eagle take).   
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I drug.31  And one (4%) involved an attempt to use RFRA as a defense to a 
prosecution for sending a threatening letter to a doctor training to provide 
abortions.32  Table 2 shows this breakdown of the four categories of RFRA 
claims. 
Table 2. RFRA Claims 2012–2017 
Type of Claim No. Percentage 
Contraception Mandate 18 78% 
Native American 3 13% 
Drugs 1 4% 
Other 1 4% 
All 23 100% 
 
We suspected that the large number of contraception mandate cases in 
2012–2017 was an anomaly.  So we conducted a search of all RFRA 
decisions over the previous five years: 2007–2012.33  That search returned 
24 decisions (10 Tenth Circuit and 14 district court decisions), of which 8 
decisions (6 Tenth Circuit and 2 district court decisions) involved a federal 
or state RFRA claim. 
The RFRA claims in these 8 decisions fall into the same categories we 
have previously identified.  There were no contraception mandate claims, 
because the mandate was not imposed until January 20, 2012.34  But there 
were five decisions (63%) involving Native Americans (four involving 
access to eagle feathers, and one involving objections to an autopsy)35 and 
three decisions (38%), in one case, involving the use of drugs.36  Table 3 
shows this breakdown of the various categories of RFRA claims for the 
previous five years. 
 
 
 31  Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014).   
 32  U.S. v. Dillard, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Kan. 2012).   
 33  We searched adv: “religious freedom restoration act” RFRA & DA(aft 02-24-2007 & 
bef 02-25-2012)—first filtered to include all Tenth Circuit decisions, then filtered to include 
all reported district court decisions in the Tenth Circuit.   
 34  News Release, A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum Servs. (Jan. 20, 2012).  The first 
lawsuit challenging the mandate was brought on November 10, 2011.  See Complaint, 
Belmont Abby Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 11-1989).   
 35  United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) (eagle feathers); Ross v. Bd. 
of Regents of The Univ. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2010) (autopsy); United States v. 
Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (eagle feathers); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. 
Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009) (eagle feathers); United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 
(D. Utah 2009) (eagle feathers), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).   
 36  United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Quaintance, 315 F. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Quaintance, 523 F.3d 1144 
(10th Cir. 2008).   
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Table 3. RFRA Claims 2007–2012 
Type of Claim No. Percentage 
Contraception Mandate 0 0% 
Native American 5 63% 
Drugs 3 38% 
Other 0 0% 
All 8 100% 
 
Combining these 8 RFRA decisions from 2007–2012 with the 23 
RFRA decisions from 2012–2017 provides a new data set comprised of 31 
RFRA decisions.37  This data is summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. RFRA Claims 2007–2017 
Type of Claim 2007–2012 2012–2017 Total Percentage 
Contraception 
Mandate 
0 18 18 58% 
Native American 5 3 8 26% 
Drugs 3 1 4 13% 
Other 0 1 1 3% 
All 8 23 31 100% 
 
This table suggests that the contraception mandate cases were an 
anomaly.  Not including the contraception mandate cases, there were only 
13 RFRA decisions in 10 years (8 decisions from 2007–2012, and 5 
decisions from 2012–2017).  But the contraception mandate cases added 
another 18 RFRA decisions in 5 years—more than doubling the rate of all 
other RFRA decisions combined. 
This dynamic must be kept in mind when considering the other aspects 
of this study.  For example, the five-year surge in contraception mandate 
cases significantly affected the overall frequency of religious liberty 
decisions.  With those cases included in the data set, religious liberty 
decisions (excluding prisoner and asylum claims) constituted 0.6% of the 
courts’ docket.38  Without those cases, religious liberty decisions constituted 
only 0.4% of the courts’ docket.39  The contraception mandate cases also 
affect the demographics of religious liberty claimants and the overall success 
rates of religious liberty claims, as we explain below. 
 
 37  Two decisions involve state RFRAs, both in cases brought by Native Americans. See 
Ross, 599 F.3d 1114; Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 
2016).   
 38  59/9,966 = 0.006.   
 39  41/9,948 = 0.004.   
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But the RFRA numbers are also interesting in several other respects.  
First, aside from contraception mandate cases, the number of RFRA cases is 
quite small—only 13 decisions in 10 years.  By way of comparison, over the 
same 10-year period, there are 109 Tenth Circuit and reported district court 
decisions mentioning the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)40—a 
statute that receives far less national attention. 
Second, the range of RFRA cases is quite narrow.  Of the 13 non-
contraception decisions, 8 involved Native Americans (7 seeking access to 
eagle parts, 1 challenging an autopsy); 4 involved drugs; and 1 was an odd 
case involving a threatening letter.  This indicates that there is not a wide 
range of groups invoking RFRA for a wide range of purposes. 
Third, the share of RFRA decisions involving Native Americans is 
surprisingly high—62% of the non-contraception mandate cases.  These 
decisions present an interesting parallel with the contraception mandate 
cases.  Specifically, both involve federal laws that directly conflict with 
widespread practices among specific religious groups—namely, opposition 
to facilitating contraception and abortion among Catholics and Protestants, 
and the desire to use eagle feathers and eagle parts among Native Americans.  
Thus far, the Native American cases within the Tenth Circuit have been 
largely unsuccessful.  But the Fifth Circuit recently ruled in favor of Native 
Americans in an eagle feathers case, expressly relying on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, a contraception mandate case.41  That may 
prompt additional challenges in the Tenth Circuit until the law is changed or 
the legal questions are definitively resolved. 
Finally, the success rate of RFRA claims is sharply divided.  Of the 18 
RFRA decisions involving the contraception mandate, 10 were successful—
i.e., resolved in favor of the religious claimant.  But of the remaining 13 
RFRA cases, only 2 were successful and one of those was later reversed by 
a Tenth Circuit panel decision.42  We discuss these success rates in more 
detail in Part IV, infra. 
 
 
 
 40  We searched adv: “national environmental policy act” & DA(aft 02-24-2007 & bef 
02-25-2017)—first filtered to include all Tenth Circuit decisions, then filtered to include all 
reported district court decisions in the Tenth Circuit.  This returned 54 Tenth Circuit decisions 
and 55 reported district court decisions.   
 41  McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).   
 42  United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 
(10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009).   
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III. DEMOGRAPHICS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMANTS 
In addition to the frequency and type of religious liberty claims, we 
considered the identity of religious liberty claimants.  In particular, what 
religious groups are bringing claims?  And are they being brought by 
individuals or groups?  Our results show that a disproportionate share of 
claims are brought by individual non-Christians.  And this finding becomes 
even more significant when we control for the contraception mandate cases, 
which were brought exclusively by Christians. 
A. Methodology 
Consistent with prior research, we relied upon the religious self-
identification of each claimant.43  In our data set, religious claimants can be 
grouped into four broad categories. 
 “Christian”: This group consists of all claimants who self-
identify as Christian—including Catholics, Protestants,44 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(Mormons),45 and Fundamentalist Mormons.46  Those who 
identified as Catholic, Protestant, or generically as “Christian” 
are further grouped together under the subcategory “Catholic/
Protestant.”47 
 
 43  Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 247 (citing Pew 
Research Center’s and Gallup, Inc.’s practice of relying upon self-identification by 
individuals).   
 44  Protestants include evangelical, mainline, and historical black protestant groups.   
 45  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints typically refers to its members as 
“Latter-day Saints” or “LDS.”  Scott Taylor, LDS or Mormon? It Depends, DESERET NEWS 
(Utah) (Apr. 2, 2011), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700123737/LDS-or-Mormon-It-
depends.html.  But the term “Mormon” is more common and is increasingly accepted by 
members of the church itself.  Id.  This Article uses the more common term.   
 46  We use the term “Fundamentalist Mormon” to include groups that broke with the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints over the issue of polygamy, including the 
Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (FLDS) and the Apostolic United 
Brethren Church (AUB).   
 47  We recognize the labels “Christian” and “Catholic/Protestant” create some difficulties.  
See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 
967 (2004) (acknowledging that “the label of ‘Christian’ is often too simplistic to reflect the 
reality of American religion”).  Because several cases involved a combination of Catholics 
and Protestants, and others referred to the religious claimants generically as “Christian,” we 
have grouped these in a single subcategory labeled “Catholic/Protestant.”  This eliminates the 
need to choose between coding a case as either Catholic or Protestant when both groups were 
involved, or to create a separate but almost certainly overlapping category of generic 
“Christians.”   
  Other groups also identify as Christian but are not Catholic or Protestant—e.g., 
LDS/Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, among others.  Of those groups, only Mormons 
were involved in decisions in our data set.  The “Catholic/Protestant” subgrouping also allows 
us to consider Mormons separately from Catholics and Protestants, which is valuable because 
Mormons make up less than 1.6% of the population nationally, Pew Research Center, 
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 “Other religions”: This group consists of members of all other 
faith traditions—including Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, 
Native Americans, and other smaller groups.48 
 “Non-religious”: This group consists of non-religious 
claimants who brought religious liberty claims to challenge the 
expression of religion by others, including claims under the 
Establishment Clause. 
 “Unknown”: This group consists of claimants whose religious 
affiliation was not disclosed. 
B. Religious Minorities Bring a Disproportionate Share of Claims. 
We first consider the 59 religious liberty decisions that did not involve 
prisoners or asylum seekers.  Table 5 shows the religious demographics of 
the claimants in these decisions.49 
 
Table 5. Religious Claimant Demographics Per Decision 
Religious Affiliation No. Percentage 
Christian     
 Catholic/Protestant 25 42% 
 Fundamentalist Mormon 3 5% 
 Mormon 1 2% 
 Total 29 49% 
Other Religions   
 Muslim 7 12% 
 Native American 4 7% 
 Hindu 2 3% 
 Total 13 29% 
Non-Religious 10 17% 
Unknown 7 12% 
 
 
 
 
Religious Landscape Study: Religions, (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/, but a significantly larger percentage of the population in the Tenth Circuit, 
including 55% of the population in Utah, Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: 
Adults in Utah, (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/utah/, and 
9% in Wyoming, Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Wyoming, 
(2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/wyoming/.   
 48  These include Rastafarian, Odinism, Paganism, Nations of Gods and Earths (Black 
Muslim Movement), Christian Identity and Christian Separatism, Ever Increasing Faith, 
Ashutosh Maharaj, and Moorish Science Temple of America.   
 49  Again, the numbers add up to more than 59 and more than 100% because some 
decisions involved multiple claimants from different religious groups.   
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A few points stand out.  First, Catholics and Protestants are the largest 
group, with 25 decisions; but they still account for fewer than half of all 
decisions (42%).  The second largest group is the non-religious claimants, 
with 10 decisions (17%), 7 of which were Establishment Clause challenges.50  
The third largest group is Muslims, with 7 decisions (12%), all but one of 
which came in Title VII cases alleging religious employment 
discrimination.51  The fourth largest is Native Americans, with 4 decisions 
(7%), all involving eagle feathers.52  Next are Fundamentalist Mormons, 
with 3 decisions (7%), 2 involving a challenge to Utah’s polygamy law, and 
1 involving a church trust dispute.53  There are 2 cases involving Hindus 
(5%), both in Title VII employment disputes.54  And there is 1 case involving 
Mormons (2%), who brought Title VII employment and equal protection 
claims.55 
As noted above, however, we are studying an anomalous time period 
involving a spate of 18 contraception mandate cases.  What if those cases 
were excluded?  Those results are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 50  See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1215–21 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent 
from denial of rehearing en banc); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016); 
Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2014); Am. Humanist Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas 
County Sch. Dist. Re-1, 158 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (D. Colo. 2016); Medina v. Catholic Health 
Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (D. Colo. 2015); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 
1233 (D.N.M. 2014); United States v. Goxcon-Chagal, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2012).  
The other cases included two Title VII cases where the plaintiff was suing based on someone 
else’s religious actions and one RFRA challenge to the drug classification of marijuana.  See 
Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014) (RFRA); Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y 
of State for Kan., 2016 WL 4528065 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2016) (Title VII); Didier v. Abbott 
Labs., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (D. Kan. 2014) (Title VII).   
 51  See Chawla v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Colo. 2014) (Muslim 
employee Title VII claim); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (same); Kaiser v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 504 F. App’x 739 (10th Cir. 2012) (same); 
EEOC Comm’n v. JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); EEOC v. 
704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.N.M. 2013) (same); EEOC v. Jetstream 
Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. 
Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (Establishment Clause, free exercise, and equal protection 
claims).   
 52  U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (Native American eagle feather 
case); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (same); 
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015) (same); N. Arapaho Tribe v. 
Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (same).   
 53  Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (polygamy law challenge); 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (church trust dispute); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) 
(polygamy law challenge).   
 54  Desai v. Panguitch Main St., Inc., 527 F. App’x 689 (10th Cir. 2013); Aluru v. 
Anesthesia Consultants, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (D. Colo. 2016).   
 55  Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013).   
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Table 6. Religious Claimant Demographics  
Excluding Contraception Mandate Decisions 
Religious Affiliation No. Percentage 
Christian     
 Catholic/Protestant 7 17% 
 Fundamentalist Mormon 3 7% 
 Mormon 1 2% 
 Total 11 27% 
Other Religions   
 Muslim 7 17% 
 Native American 4 10% 
 Hindu 2 5% 
 Total 13 32% 
Non-Religious 10 24% 
Unknown 7 17% 
 
Excluding the contraception mandate cases, the largest single group of 
claimants in the religious liberty decisions are the non-religious, at 24%.  
Catholics and Protestants are tied for second with Muslims at 17%, despite 
the fact that Muslims make up less than 1% of the population.56  Other 
religions outnumber Catholics and Protestants by almost 2:1 (32% to 17%). 
But none of this means very much if we do not know the religious 
demographics of the Tenth Circuit as a whole.  Although the U.S. Census 
does not ask about religious affiliation,57 the Pew Research Center conducted 
a comprehensive study of the nation’s religious landscape in 2014, the 
middle year of our five-year timeframe.58  The results of that study, broken 
 
 56  See Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Colorado (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/colorado/ (<1% in Colorado); Pew 
Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Kansas (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/kansas/ (1% in Kansas); Pew 
Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in New Mexico (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/new-mexico/ (<1% in New 
Mexico); Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Oklahoma (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/oklahoma/ (<1% in Oklahoma); 
Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Utah (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/utah/ (1% in Utah); Pew Research 
Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Wyoming (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/wyoming/ (<1% in Wyoming); 
Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study (2014), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (0.9% in the United States).   
 57  See Anne Farris Rosen, A Brief History of Religion and the U.S. Census, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.pewforum.org/2010/01/26/a-brief-history-of-
religion-and-the-u-s-census/ (explaining the history of religion on the U.S. Census).   
 58  Religious Landscape Study: About the Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/about-the-religious-landscape-study/ (conducting a 
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out by the states of the Tenth Circuit and nationally, is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Religious Demographics in the 
Tenth Circuit States and Nationally59 
Religious  
Affiliation 
CO KS NM OK UT WY US 
Christian          
 Protestant 43% 57% 38% 69% 14% 44% 46.6% 
 Catholic 16% 18% 34% 8% 5% 14% 20.8% 
 Mormon 2% 1% 1% 1% 55% 9% 1.6% 
 Other  
Mormon <1% <1% 1% <1% 1% <1% <0.3% 
 Total 64% 76% 75% 79% 73% 71% 70.6% 
Other Religions         
 Muslim < 1% 1% <1% <1% 1% <1% 0.9% 
 Hindu <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 0.7% 
 Native  
American < 1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 1% <0.3% 
Unaffiliated 
(Non-Religious) 29% 20% 21% 18% 22% 26% 22.8% 
 
Not surprisingly, Catholics and Protestants are the largest religious 
groups in most states.  The one exception is Utah, where Mormons are a 
majority at 55%.  The next largest group consists of those who are 
unaffiliated with a religion (including atheists, agnostics, and “nothing in 
particular”), who make up 18% to 29%. 
Using this data, combined with the estimated population for each state 
in 2014,60 we can determine the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit 
as a whole.61  Those calculations are reflected in Table 8. 
 
U.S. Religious Landscape Study based on telephone interviews with more than 35,000 
Americans in all 50 states).   
 59  All percentages are drawn from the 2014 Pew U.S. Religious Landscape Study.  See 
supra note 56.   
 60  The United States Census Bureau estimates state populations per year.  For 2014—the 
same year the Pew study was conducted—the Tenth Circuit state populations were: 5,349,648 
(Colorado); 2,899,360 (Kansas); 2,083,024 (New Mexico); 3,877,499 (Oklahoma); 2,941,836 
(Utah); and 583,642 (Wyoming).  NATIONAL, STATE, AND PUERTO RICO COMMONWEALTH 
TOTALS DATASETS: POPULATION, POPULATION CHANGE, AND ESTIMATED COMPONENTS OF 
POPULATION CHANGE: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html (last visited Nov. 
18, 2017).  The total population of the Tenth Circuit states in 2014 was 17,735,009.  See id.   
 61  Multiplying the state population by the percentage of each religious group gave us the 
population of each religious group in each state.  Adding together each state population for 
each religious group and then dividing by the total population, gave us the percentage each 
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Table 8. Religious Demographics in the Tenth Circuit and Nationally 
Religious Affiliation US 10th Cir. 
Christian     
 Catholic/Protestant 67.4% 60% 
 Mormon 1.6% 11% 
 Fundamentalist Mormon <0.3% 1% 
 Total 70.6% 72% 
Other Religions   
 Hindu 0.9% 1% 
 Muslim 0.7% 1% 
 Native American <0.3% 1% 
 Total 1.9% 3% 
Unaffiliated 22.8% 23% 
 
In the Tenth Circuit states, Catholics and Protestants comprise about 
7.4% less than the national average, while Mormons comprise about 9.4% 
more than the national average.  The percentage of other religions and those 
who are unaffiliated is on par with the national average.62 
Using the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit as a whole, we 
can now determine whether any particular religious demographic is 
overrepresented, underrepresented, or accurately represented in their share 
of religious liberty decisions as a whole.  To do this, we use a number called 
the representation ratio.63  For any given group: 
 
 
representation ratio = 
     % of decisions involving a religious group 
     % of religious group as share of population 
 
The representation ratio is a non-negative number that provides a 
meaningful measure of the religious group’s descriptive representation.64  A 
representation ratio of 0 indicates that a group is not represented at all.  
Ratios below 1 indicate that the group is underrepresented in litigation 
 
religious group comprised of the total population.   
 62  The Pew survey listed several religious minorities as “<1%” of the population in the 
various Tenth Circuit states.  See supra Table 7.  Absent more precise data, we rounded each 
of these groups up to 1%.  This ensures that our representation ratio errs on the side of 
caution—i.e., understating any degree of overrepresentation of religious minorities (except 
for Mormons who have greater than or equal to 1% of the population in each Tenth Circuit 
state).   
 63  Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 4, at 12 (citing PITKIN, HANNA F., THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION (1967)).  Of course, out-of-circuit residents could file religious liberty 
claims in the Tenth Circuit.  But this does not appear to be common.   
 64  See id.   
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compared with its population.  A ratio of 1 means that the group’s share of 
religious liberty decisions perfectly matches its share of the population as a 
whole.  Ratios above 1 show that the group is represented in a 
disproportionately high share of religious liberty decisions compared with 
its population.65 
Table 9 shows the representation ratio of each religious group in all 
religious liberty decisions in the Tenth Circuit, excluding prisoner and 
asylum cases. 
 
Table 9. Representation Ratio of Religious Claimants Per Decision 
Religious Affiliation Representation Ratio
Muslim 11.86 
Native American 6.78 
Fundamentalist Mormon 5.08 
Hindu 3.39 
Non-Religious 0.74 
Catholic/Protestant 0.70 
Mormon 0.16 
 
This table shows that, as a portion of the total population, Muslims, 
Native Americans, Fundamentalist Mormons, and Hindus are all 
overrepresented as a share of religious freedom decisions.  Non-religious and 
Catholics and Protestants are somewhat underrepresented at 0.74 and 0.70, 
respectively.  And Mormons are significantly underrepresented at 0.16. 
When we control for the anomalous spate of contraception mandate 
cases, the differences are even sharper.  Table 10 shows the representation 
ratio of each religious group when contraception mandate cases (along with 
prisoner and asylum cases) are excluded. 
 
Table 10. Representation Ratio of Religious Claimants  
Per Non-Contraception Mandate Decisions 
Religious Affiliation Representation Ratio
Muslim 17.07 
Native American 9.76 
Fundamentalist Mormon 7.32 
Hindu 4.88 
Non-Religious 1.06 
Catholic/Protestant 0.28 
Mormon 0.23 
 
 
 65  Id.   
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Muslims, Native Americans, Fundamentalist Mormons, and Hindus are 
even more overrepresented than before.  Non-religious claimants are now 
almost perfectly represented—although we might have expected them to be 
the least represented group, given that we are considering only religious 
liberty decisions.  The representation ratio of Catholics and Protestants 
dropped significantly from 0.70 to 0.28.  This is not surprising, given that all 
contraception mandate cases were brought by Catholics or Protestants.  
Slightly less represented were Mormons, at 0.23. 
These numbers contradict the popular narrative that religious freedom 
cases predominantly involve the large Christian groups.  This is not true in 
absolute terms, as Catholics and Protestants were involved in only 42% of 
religious liberty decisions, and only 17% of decisions when the anomalous 
contraception mandate cases are excluded.  But it is particularly untrue when 
considering the religious demographics of the population as a whole, as 
Catholics, Protestants, and Mormons are significantly underrepresented, 
while non-Christian minorities are significantly overrepresented.  This 
suggests that religious liberty jurisprudence is disproportionately important 
for protecting non-Christian religious minorities. 
C. Religious Minorities Predominate in Prisoner Cases. 
Thus far, we have considered the religious demographics in decisions 
not involving prisoner or asylum claims.  But prisoner and asylum cases also 
have interesting religious demographics of their own.  Table 11 shows the 
religious demographics of claimants in prisoner decisions. 
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Table 11. Religious Affiliation of Prisoner Decisions 
Religious Affiliation No. Percentage 
Christian     
 Catholic/Protestant 4 10% 
 Mormon 1 3% 
 Total 5 13% 
Other Religions    
 Jewish 4 10% 
 Muslim 4 10% 
 Native American 3 8% 
 Christian Identity/Christian Separatism 2 5% 
 Nations of Gods and Earths  2 5% 
 Ever Increasing Faith 1 3% 
 Moorish Science Temple of America 1 3% 
 Odinism 1 3% 
 Paganism 1 3% 
 Rastafarian 1 3% 
 Satanist 1 3% 
 Total 20 51% 
Unknown 13 33% 
 
Over half of all prisoner decisions involved non-Christian religious 
minorities.  The most frequently appearing were Muslims, Jews, and Native 
Americans.  Decisions involving Muslims or Jews often involved challenges 
to the denial of religious diets.66  Other decisions involved requests for access 
to religious worship services, such as a Native American sweat lodge.67  Only 
 
 66  See, e.g., Chapman v. Lampert, 555 F. App’x 758 (10th Cir. 2014) (Orthodox Jewish 
prisoner requests religious diet); Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) 
(Jewish prisoner requests kosher diet); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x 692 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Muslim prisoner requests kosher diet); Miller v. Scott, 592 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir. 
2015) (Muslim prisoner requests halal or kosher diet).   
 67  See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (Native American prisoner 
requests access to sweat lodge for religious ceremonies).  Justice Gorsuch identified 
Yellowbear as one of the ten most significant cases over which he presided when he was a 
judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary: Questionnaire 
for Nominee to the Supreme Court, 115th Cong. 25, 30–31 (2017) (statement of Neil Gorsuch, 
Circuit J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit), https://www.judici
ary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch%20SJQ%20(Public).pdf.  In that 
case, Yellowbear, a Northern Arapaho Native American prisoner sought use of the prison’s 
sweat lodge for prayer.  741 F.3d at 51–52.  The prison denied his request.  Id.  The Tenth 
Circuit found that under RLUIPA, the denial was a substantial burden on Yellowbear’s 
religious exercise and that the prison failed to establish a compelling interest when it did not 
quantify the costs associated with granting him access and that denial of access was not the 
least restrictive means of accommodating its concerns.  Id. at 62–64.  Justice Sonya 
Sotomayor quoted this opinion in her concurrence in another RLUIPA cases, Holt v. Hobbs. 
GOODRICH BUSICK (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:13 PM 
2018] SEX, DRUGS, AND EAGLE FEATHERS 377 
10% of prisoner decisions involved Catholics or Protestants—even less than 
the 17% that involved Catholics or Protestants in non-contraception mandate 
cases.  Unfortunately, we were unable to calculate a representation ratio for 
these decisions, because data on the religious demographics of Tenth Circuit 
prisons is unavailable.68 
D. Christians Bring a Majority of Asylum Cases. 
Asylum decisions tell a different story.  Table 12 shows the religious 
demographics of claimants in asylum decisions.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  In Holt, an Arkansas inmate Abdul 
Muhammad was denied the ability to grow a half-inch beard in accordance with his Muslim 
faith, even though Arkansas already allowed inmates to grow beards for medical reasons, and 
Mr. Muhammad’s beard would be permissible in 44 state and federal prison systems across 
the country.  Id. at 859 (majority opinion); Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. 
Ct. 853 (2015) (No. 13-6827).  The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Mr. Muhammad 
had shown a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that Arkansas failed to show a 
compelling interest in prohibiting the beard.  135 S. Ct. at 859.  Co-author Goodrich was co-
counsel for the plaintiff in Holt.   
 68  One article reported federal prisoner religious demographics from 2013.  See Mona 
Chalabi, Are Prisoners Less Likely to Be Atheists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:07 
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-prisoners-less-likely-to-be-atheists/ (data was 
obtained through a FOIA request).  And a 2012 Pew study conducted a survey of prison 
chaplains.  See Pew Research Center, Religion in Prisons—A 50 State Survey of Prison 
Chaplains, (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/03/22/prison-chaplains-exec/.  
But neither provides accurate data on the religious demographics of prisoners within the Tenth 
Circuit as a whole.  Interestingly, the Pew survey reported on the likelihood that various types 
of accommodations would be granted, finding that requests for religious books or texts and 
meetings with leaders from the inmates’ faith are usually approved, requests for special 
religious diets, items, or clothing are less likely to be approved, and requests for a special 
hairstyle or grooming are most likely to be denied.  Id.  It will be interesting to see how those 
numbers change in light of the Supreme Court’s first RLUIPA decision, Holt v. Hobbs, 135 
S. Ct. 853 (2015), which held that a Muslim prisoner must be permitted to grow a half-inch 
beard.   
 69  The percentages add up to more than 100% because one case, Bwika v. Holder, 527 
F. App’x 772, 774 (10th Cir. 2013), involved both Christian and Muslim petitioners.   
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Table 12. Religious Affiliation of Asylum Decisions 
Religious Affiliation No. Percentage 
Christian     
 Catholic/Protestant 14 70% 
 Mormon 2 10% 
 Total 16 76% 
Other Religions   
 Sikh 2 10% 
 Hindu 1 5% 
 Ashutosh Maharaj  1 5% 
 Muslim 1 5% 
 Total 5 24% 
 
The majority of decisions involved Christians (76%).  Far fewer 
involved other religious minorities (24%).  But this is not surprising.  In the 
typical asylum case based on religious persecution, the asylum seeker is a 
religious minority in her country of origin.  For example, 10 of the 14 
decisions involving Catholics or Protestants were brought by citizens of 
China,70 where those groups are a minority71 and where persecution of 
religious minorities since 2012 has reportedly intensified.72 
 
 
 
 70  Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2016); Daoi Kai He v. Lynch, 638 F. App’x 
717 (10th Cir. 2016); Binbin He v. Lynch, 607 F. App’x 826 (10th Cir. 2015); Zhe Sun v. 
Holder, 607 F. App’x 801 (10th Cir. 2015); Jin Jian Chen v. Lynch, 630 F. App’x 798 (10th 
Cir. 2015); Jing Li v. Holder, 607 F. App’x 818 (10th Cir. 2015); Ronghua He v. Holder, 555 
F. App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2014); Liying Qiu v. Holder, 576 F. App’x 855 (10th Cir. 2014); Jin 
Hua Lin v. Holder, 500 F. App’x 782 (10th Cir. 2012); Yuan Shan Wu v. Holder, 501 F. 
App’x 786 (10th Cir. 2012).  The other four asylum decisions involving Catholics or 
Protestants were brought by citizens of Kenya, Indonesia, Morocco, and Romania.  See Ballad 
v. Holder, 554 F. App’x 705 (10th Cir. 2014) (Morocco); Adam v. Holder, 576 F. App’x 804 
(10th Cir. 2014) (Indonesia); Ilioi v. Holder, 566 F. App’x 652 (10th Cir. 2014) (Romania); 
Bwika, 527 F. App’x 772 (Kenya).   
 71  In China, Chinese Buddhists comprise the largest faith group with an estimated 185–
250 million followers.  James Griffiths & Matt Rivers, As Atheist China Warms to the Vatican, 
Religious Persecution “Intensifies”, CNN (Mar. 1, 2017, 9:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com
/2017/02/28/asia/china-religious-persecution-christianity/index.html.  Christianity is the 
second largest faith group, with only 72–92 million followers.  Id.   
 72  See, e.g., id. (“Christians, and other believers, have long faced oppression within 
China.”); SARAH COOK, THE BATTLE FOR CHINA’S SPIRIT: RELIGIOUS REVIVAL, REPRESSION, 
AND RESISTANCE UNDER XI JINPING (Annie Bovarian et al. eds, 2017), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_ChinasSprit2016_FULL_FINAL_140pages
_compressed.pdf (Freedom House report covering religious persecution in China).   
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IV. SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMS 
In addition to the demographics of religious claimants, we wanted to 
determine what types of religious liberty claims are succeeding on the merits 
and what types are failing. 
A. Methodology 
To analyze success, we first coded each religious liberty decision as 
either a win or loss.  A decision counted as a win if any of the issues in the 
decision were resolved in favor of the claimant raising the religious claim.73  
It counted as a loss if all of the issues were resolved against the religious 
claimant.  Then, within the wins and losses we coded each decision as having 
been resolved on purely procedural grounds or on the merits.  Purely 
procedural grounds consist of issues like mootness, lack of standing, or 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies—issues that prevent a court from 
opining on the merits of a religious liberty claim.  But if a court addressed 
the merits of a religious liberty claim in any way, it was coded as a resolution 
on the merits.  Finally, it is important to note that not all decisions on the 
merits are created equally.  For example, if a court holds that a plaintiff’s 
claim survives summary judgment because there are disputed issues of fact, 
that is not as significant as a grant of summary judgment in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  So our coding also considered whether a claim was only “partially” 
successful (because it survived a motion to dismiss or motion for summary 
judgment) or fully successful (because the court granted the claimant a 
preliminary injunction or summary judgment).  Using the same system, we 
also coded whether each individual religious claim in a decision won or lost 
on the merits or on purely procedural grounds. 
B. Successful Religious Liberty Claims are Rare. 
Of the 59 religious liberty decisions excluding prisoners and asylum 
seekers, 11 (19%) were resolved on procedural grounds (such as mootness74 
or failure to exhaust administrative remedies75)—leaving 48 decisions that 
addressed the merits.  Of those 48 decisions addressing the merits, there were 
21 wins (44%) and 27 losses (56%).  As noted above, however, not all “wins” 
are created equally.  Of the 21 wins, 6 decisions were only “partial” 
victories—i.e., the plaintiffs’ claims survived a motion to dismiss or motion 
 
 73  We treated Establishment Clause claims the same way—that is, we coded a decision 
as a win if the court resolved any part of the claim in favor of the claimant challenging the 
government’s action under the Establishment Clause.  This eliminates any value judgments 
about how Establishment Clause claims “should” be resolved.   
 74  See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).   
 75  See, e.g., Paige v. Donovan, 511 F. App’x 729 (10th Cir. 2013).   
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for summary judgment.76  Fifteen decisions were full victories on the 
merits—either granting the claimant a preliminary injunction or resolving a 
claim entirely in favor of the religious claimant.  Thus, if we include partial 
victories, religious claimants were successful 44% of the time; if we include 
only full victories, claimants were successful 31% of the time. 
As noted above, however, we are studying a timeframe involving an 
unusual spate of 18 contraception mandate decisions.  Seventeen of those 
decisions reached the merits—with 10 ruling in favor of the plaintiffs (59%), 
and 7 against (41%).  That means that the contraception mandate decisions 
tended to be more successful than average, raising the overall success rate in 
religious liberty decisions.  This is due in part to the fact that there were 
multiple pending cases that all had to be resolved the same way—in favor of 
the religious claimant—after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby 
Lobby77 and Little Sisters of the Poor.78  If the contraception mandate 
decisions are excluded, the success rate of plaintiffs is lower: 35% if we 
include partial victories (11 wins out of 31 decisions) and 16% if we include 
only full victories (5 wins out of 31 decisions).  If we include prisoner and 
asylum cases, the success rate would be even lower.79  Other studies have 
found similarly low success rates on religious liberty claims.80 
The bottom line is that successful religious liberty claims are rare.  As 
noted in Part II.A, there are not many religious liberty claims to begin with–
approximately 0.6% of the judicial docket.  They are often resolved on purely 
procedural grounds (19% of the time).  When the courts do reach the merits, 
they decide in favor of the plaintiffs, at most, 44% of the time (including 
partial victories and the anomalous spate of contraception mandate cases), 
 
 76  While such a ruling might eventually lead to a settlement, that is not the same as a 
final judgment on the merits.   
 77  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).   
 78  Zubik v. Burwell (Little Sisters of the Poor), 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).   
 79  See infra Part IV.H.  Prisoners had a success rate of 25% for all victories and 0% for 
full victories.  Asylum seekers had only 1 partially successful decision out of 20 (5%).   
 80  For example, Sisk and Heise conducted studies from 1986–1995 and from 1996–2005 
on how judges voted in decisions involving religious claims.  For free exercise and 
accommodation claims—which includes the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, RLUIPA, the 
Equal Access Act, equal protection, free speech and employment-discrimination claims—
religious claimants were successful at a rate of 35.6% of judicial participation from 1986–
1995, and at a rate of 35.5% from 1996–2005. Sisk & Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty, 
supra note 4, at 238–39 & n.39; Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in the 
Courts, supra note 4, at 1025.  For Establishment Clause claims, religious claimants were 
successful at a rate of 42.3% of judicial participations from 1986–1995, and at a rate of 39.8% 
from 1996–2005.  Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?, supra note 4, at 1211 & 
n.42.  But there are differences between Sisk and Heise’s studies and ours that make 
comparison difficult.  For example, they included prisoner cases; we (for present purposes) 
do not.  They also counted each vote of each court of appeals judge separately; we counted 
only the overall decision.   
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and as little as 16% of the time (excluding partial victories and contraception 
mandate cases).  Thus, at the end of a five-year period encompassing over 
10,000 decisions within the Tenth Circuit, there were only 15 fully 
successful religious liberty claims (consisting of 10 contraception mandate 
victories and 5 victories in other cases) on five discrete issues—sharia, 
polygamy, eagle feathers, contraception, and Ten Commandments. 
C. Success Rates Vary by Type of Claim. 
Given the small number of victories, it is easy to consider them in 
greater depth.  Successful claims fall into the following five categories: 
 10 victories in contraception mandate (RFRA) decisions;81 
 3 victories in Establishment Clause decisions;82 
 2 victories in free exercise decisions;83 
 5 partial victories in Title VII cases;84 and 
 1 partial victory in a speech case.85 
We first wanted to consider the success rates of each type of claim.  To 
do this, we examined only decisions addressing the merits of a claim (either 
partially or fully).  We then divided the number of successful claims of each 
type by the total number of claims of that type.  The results are reflected in 
Table 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 81  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc); 
Newland v. Burwell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Colo. 2015); Armstrong v. Burwell, No. 13-cv-
00563, 2014 WL 5317354 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014); Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1245 
(D. Colo. 2014); Colorado Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (D. Colo. 2014); 
Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (W.D. Okla. 2014); Catholic 
Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (W.D. Okla. 2014); Newland v. 
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); Armstrong v. Sebelius, 531 F. App’x 938 
(10th Cir. 2013); Newland v. Sebelius, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013).   
 82  Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016) (striking down Ten 
Commandments display); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014) 
(same); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (striking down sharia ban).   
 83  N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015) (eagle feathers); 
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (polygamy).   
 84  Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., No. 15-cv-4918, 2016 WL 4528065 
(D. Kan. Aug. 30, 2016) (no religion); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 
3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015) (Muslim); EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 
2015) (Muslim); EEOC v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. New Mexico 
2013) (Muslim); Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013) 
(Mormon).   
 85  Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal of a 
compelled speech claim). 
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Table 13. Success Rate of Each Religious Claim 
Religious Claim Success Rate
RFRA 48% 
Title VII 33% 
Establishment Clause 29% 
Free Exercise Clause 20% 
Free Speech Clause 14% 
 
This suggests that RFRA claims are most successful, Title VII and 
Establishment Clause claims are moderately successful, and free exercise 
and speech claims are least successful.  But given the small sample size and 
other dynamics, these numbers do not tell the whole story.  For example, all 
10 RFRA victories came in contraception mandate cases.  If contraception 
mandate cases are excluded, the 4 remaining RFRA decisions on the merits 
were losses—resulting in a success rate of 0%.  Furthermore, all 5 Title VII 
victories were only partial—i.e., decisions denying a defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment or motion to dismiss.  If partial victories are excluded, 
the 10 remaining Title VII decisions on the merits were all losses—also 
resulting in a success rate of 0%.  The same is true of the lone free speech 
victory. Although the claim achieved partial success by surviving a motion 
to dismiss, it was ultimately unsuccessful on the merits—resulting in a 
success rate of 0%.86 
Given the small number of successful religious liberty claims, it is 
worth examining them in further detail—and, in some cases, contrasting 
them with unsuccessful claims.  Thus, in the following sections, we consider, 
in turn, each type of successful claim: RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Establishment Clause, and Title VII.87  We then offer brief thoughts on 
prisoner and asylum cases, and we conclude by considering what we call 
“divisive” religious liberty decisions—i.e., those that prompted dissent. 
D. RFRA 
1. Contraception Mandate (“Sex”) 
As noted above, there were 10 successful RFRA decisions, all 
involving the contraception mandate.  This seems like a very large number, 
given that there were only 10 other victories overall (5 partial victories in 
Title VII cases, and 5 total victories in other cases). 
 
 
 86  Compare id. (reversing dismissal of a compelled speech claim) with Cressman v. 
Thompson, 798 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015) (ultimately rejecting the same claim). 
 87  We do not consider the lone partial victory under the Free Speech Clause because the 
claim ultimately failed on the merits. Id. 
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But a few considerations put this number in perspective.  First, the 10 
successful decisions came in only 6 separate cases.  That is because several 
cases generated multiple decisions.  For example, in Newland v. Sebelius, 
there was a district court decision granting a preliminary injunction,88 a 
Tenth Circuit decision affirming the preliminary injunction in light of Hobby 
Lobby,89 and then another district court decision entering a permanent 
injunction.90  Although some non-contraception mandate cases also 
generated multiple decisions, this happened significantly more often in 
contraception mandate cases. 
Second, 4 of the 10 favorable decisions were simply “clean up” 
decisions following Hobby Lobby—that is, once the Tenth Circuit (or 
Supreme Court) resolved Hobby Lobby, the pending cases presenting the 
same issue were resolved the same way.91 
Finally, the 10 favorable decisions in 6 separate contraception mandate 
cases were also balanced by 7 losses in 5 separate contraception mandate 
cases.92  Although these losses were eventually turned into wins (or 
ultimately will be) by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor, they show that contraception mandate cases were 
far from a uniform success before the Supreme Court weighed in. 
Perhaps even more interesting than the successful contraception 
mandate cases are the contraception mandate cases (and other RFRA cases) 
that were never filed.  When the Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby, the 
government and the dissent predicted “a flood of religious objections 
regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs,”93 such as “blood 
transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); 
medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and 
pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and 
vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others).”94  They also predicted 
that corporations would bring a rash of RFRA challenges outside the 
 
 88  881 F. Supp. 2d 1287.   
 89  542 F. App’x 706.   
 90  Newland v. Burwell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Colo. 2015).   
 91  Armstrong v. Burwell, No. 13-cv-00563, 2014 WL 5317354 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2014); 
Newland, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122; Newland, 542 F. App’x 706; Armstrong v. Sebelius, 531 F. 
App’x 938 (10th Cir. 2013).   
 92  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 
(10th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-6294, 2012 WL 
6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012); Ass’n of Christian Schs. Int’l v. Burwell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 
1284 (D. Colo. 2014); Diocese of Cheyenne v. Sebelius, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Wyo. 2014); 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013); 
Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).   
 93  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).   
 94  Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
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healthcare context.95  Several commentators made similar predictions.96 
But these challenges have not materialized.  Our data set extends 
through February 24, 2017—thirty-two months after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hobby Lobby.97  During that time, there have been no RFRA 
challenges in the Tenth Circuit to any other medical procedures or drugs.  
Nor have there been any new RFRA challenges by for-profit corporations—
or any organization for that matter.  In fact, there have been only two new 
RFRA decisions at all—one involving a pro se individual’s attempt to 
legalize marijuana,98 and one involving a Native American request to wear 
an eagle feather at a high school graduation.99  Both were unsuccessful.  By 
contrast, in the thirty-two months after HHS promulgated the contraception 
mandate, the courts in the Tenth Circuit had already decided 12 of the 18 
contraception mandate decisions in our data set.  So there has already been 
ample time for the “flood” of new religious objections; it simply has not 
materialized.100 
2. Drugs 
Examining unsuccessful RFRA claims also shows that courts can draw 
sensible lines when applying RFRA.  Two of those cases involved 
possession of drugs.  First, in United States v. Quaintance,101 drug smugglers 
pled guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 
but raised a RFRA defense, alleging that they were the founding members of 
the “Church of Cognizance,” which taught that marijuana is a deity and 
sacrament.  Then-Judge Gorsuch, writing for the Tenth Circuit, rejected the 
 
 95  Id. at 2804–05.   
 96  See, e.g., Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of 
Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J. F. 416, 419 (2016) (“[T]here is widespread 
fear in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—that such claims might become a 
template for similar claims, pursuant to federal or state RFRAs or analogous state 
constitutional provisions, for religious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in 
employment, or in the provision of public accommodations, on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious 
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 98 (2015) (“Might [RFRAs] now be construed to 
protect religiously motivated employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, or 
discrimination by wedding vendors, merchants in other contexts, or government officials 
against same-sex couples?”).   
 97  The Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby on June 30, 2014. 134 S. Ct. 2751.   
 98  Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014).   
 99  Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016) 
(Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act).   
 100  Cf. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 4, at 54 (finding that a comparison of federal cases 
involving a RFRA claim pre- and post-Hobby Lobby showed no significant drop in 
government win rates).   
 101  608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.).   
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claim, finding that the purported religious beliefs were not sincere.102 
Similarly, in Krumm v. Holder,103 the plaintiff brought a RFRA claim 
challenging the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled 
substance, alleging that the classification violated his religious freedom to 
use cannabis as a holy anointing oil.  The court held that the plaintiff had 
failed to state a valid facial challenge under RFRA, because he failed to 
allege that the restriction on marijuana was impermissible in all of its 
applications.104 
These cases demonstrate that RFRA is not a blank check.  Courts do 
not automatically accept all allegations of religious belief as “sincere,” and 
they can easily weed out frivolous claims.105 
3. Eagle Feathers 
If anything, courts may be underenforcing RFRA for religious 
minorities.106  An example from our data set involves Native American use 
of eagle feathers.  Aside from the contraception mandate cases, these are the 
most common RFRA cases, with 3 decisions in the last 5 years (and 7 in the 
last 10).107  In the last five years, every challenge was rejected.  In the 
previous five years, only two challenges were successful, and one of those 
two was reversed on appeal.108 
Eagle feathers play an important role in Native American religious 
practices.  But under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act,109 it is illegal 
to kill eagles or possess eagle feathers or parts without a permit.  Permits are 
available for museums, scientists, zoos, farmers, and a wide variety of other 
interests—such as power companies and airports, which kill hundreds of 
eagles every year.110  Permits are also available for Native American 
 
 102  See id. at 719.   
 103  594 F. App’x 497. 
 104  Id. at 501.  
 105  Cf. Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842680 (“There are still few 
examples of RFRA and state RFRAs giving controversial exemptions. Of course, religious 
people sometimes make tendentious claims, particularly prisoners. But those claims do not 
win. At every turn, the tendency has been toward underenforcement not overenforcement”).   
 106  Id.   
 107  See Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016); 
United States v. Aguilar. 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 
F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012); United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 
2009), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 
1129 (D. Utah 2009); United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).   
 108  Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308, rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274; Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129.   
 109  16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2016).   
 110  McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
16 U.S.C. § 668(a)); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Preliminary Injunction, at 17–22, 
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religious use—but only to members of “federally recognized” tribes.111  
Because gaining federal recognition is very difficult,112 and many tribes 
never gain it, there are currently thousands of Native Americans who are 
forever prohibited from possessing even a single eagle feather. 
The federal government’s restrictions on eagle feathers have led to 
many conflicts.  In the leading Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Wilgus,113 
a non-Native American who had practiced a Native American religion for 
many years was pulled over for speeding, and the officer searched his car for 
drugs.114  Although no drugs were found, the officer did find eagle feathers—
resulting in criminal charges and a conviction.115  On appeal, the government 
conceded that the criminal ban on possession of eagle feathers imposed a 
“substantial burden” on the defendant’s religious exercise.116  This meant 
that the government was required to satisfy strict scrutiny.  But the Tenth 
Circuit held that the government satisfied strict scrutiny, because the supply 
of eagle feathers is limited and the government has a compelling interest in 
“providing for the religious needs of members of federally-recognized 
tribes.”117  Since the decision in Wilgus, there have been three more RFRA 
cases involving the use of eagle feathers—all unsuccessful.118 
But the result in Wilgus is questionable. Perhaps due to inadequate 
briefing, the decision rests on the faulty premise that there is only one 
legitimate source of eagle feathers—the National Eagle Feather 
Repository—and that the repository has an extremely limited supply of eagle 
feathers.119  On this view, eagle feathers are a “zero-sum game”: every 
feather obtained by someone who is not a member of a federally recognized 
 
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7:07-cv-060 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/McAllen-PI-Motion-file-stamped.pdf (describing the 
eagle permits issued for non-religious uses).   
 111  50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (2017) (citing Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994, 
25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 (1994)).   
 112  See id. Part 22; 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (establishing seven “mandatory criteria” with 34 sub-
factors or categories of evidence to gain federal recognition status).   
 113  638 F.3d 1274.   
 114  Id. at 1280.   
 115  Id.   
 116  Id.   
 117  Id. at 1290.   
 118  N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (upholding restriction 
on permit); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Schs., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016) 
(rejecting free speech and free exercise claims); United States v. Aguilar, 527 Fed. App’x 808 
(10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting RFRA defense to prosecution).   
 119  Compare Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291 (concluding “that there is no significant untapped 
source of birds not already being sent to the [National Eagle Feather] Repository”), with 
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 479 (5th Cir. 2014) (detailing 
alternative sources to the National Eagle Feather Repository for obtaining eagle feathers, 
including zoos and tribal-maintained eagle aviaries).   
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tribe is taken away from a member of a federally recognized tribe.120  But in 
fact, there are many ways to obtain eagle feathers beyond the repository.  
There are federal permits to take live eagles;121 there are permits for 
operating eagle aviaries, which supply a steady stream of molted feathers;122 
and there are millions of feathers naturally molted every year in zoos and in 
the wild, which could be picked up and used for religious ceremonies if not 
for the federal prohibition.123  Beyond that, the court erred by focusing only 
on permits for Native American religious use.  There are also permits for 
museums, scientists, zoos, airports, falconers, farmers, power companies, 
and many others.124  So the regulation of eagle feathers is not a zero-sum 
game between two different groups of Native Americans; it is a multi-faceted 
game that often prefers commercial killing of eagles to the peaceful Native 
American religious use of feathers.  And it is hard to see how the government 
has a compelling interest in prohibiting a Native American from possessing 
even a single feather—without ever killing an eagle—when it 
simultaneously allows power companies to kill hundreds of eagles for 
nonreligious reasons every year.125 
Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in McAllen Grace 
Brethren Church v. Salazar126 parts ways with Wilgus.  In McAllen, an 
undercover federal agent raided a Native American powwow and confiscated 
feathers from a nationally renowned feather dancer who had used the 
feathers for many decades.127  Because the dancer was not a member of a 
federally recognized tribe, he was in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle 
Protection Act.  But the Fifth Circuit, citing Hobby Lobby, held that the 
government failed to satisfy strict scrutiny under RFRA.  The court reasoned 
that the limited supply of feathers at the repository was a problem “of the 
government’s own making,” because the government ran an “inefficient” 
 
 120  638 F.3d at 1293.   
 121  16 U.S.C. § 668a; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2016).   
 122  See generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL FISH AND WILDLIFE PERMIT 
APPLICATION FORM FOR A NATIVE AMERICAN EAGLE AVIARY PERMIT (FORM 3–200-78) 
(2013), http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-78.pdf.   
 123  Mem. from the U.S. Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General, Environment 
and National Resources Division, All U.S. Attorneys, and Director, Executive Office for U.S. 
Attorneys (Oct. 12 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2012/10/22/ef-
policy.pdf (discussing the possession or use of eagle feathers or other parts for tribal, cultural, 
and religious purposes).   
 124  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at 17–22, McAllen Grace 
Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7-60 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) http://s3.amazonaws.com/
becketpdf/McAllen-PI-Motion-file-stamped.pdf (describing the eagle permits issued for non-
religious uses).   
 125  Id. at 20–22.   
 126  764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).   
 127  McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, BECKET (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.becket
law.org/case/mcallen-grace-brethren-church-v-jewell/#caseDetail.   
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system.128  And the court held that the government had failed to show that 
“other avenues” of obtaining feathers were infeasible.129  In the wake of 
McAllen, the federal government entered a historic settlement agreement 
with the plaintiff and over 400 other Native Americans who are not members 
of federally recognized tribes, guaranteeing their right to possess feathers 
and access the repository.130  This settlement makes the result in Wilgus even 
harder to defend and may prompt additional litigation in the Tenth Circuit. 
E. Free Exercise 
When a RFRA claim is unavailable, litigants must often rely on the Free 
Exercise Clause. There were two successful free exercise decisions.  One 
involved a challenge to Utah’s bigamy statute by a polygamist family 
featured on the reality show “Sister Wives.”131  The district court held that 
the statute, as applied to religious cohabitation, was not neutral toward 
religion and was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest.132  But the Tenth Circuit vacated that decision and ordered the case 
to be dismissed as moot, because the government adopted a new enforcement 
policy eliminating any credible threat of prosecution.133 
The other successful free exercise decision involved a novel dispute 
between two Native American tribes over a request to kill bald eagles.134  The 
Northern Arapaho Tribe applied to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to take 
two bald eagles for religious purposes from the Wind River Reservation, 
where the tribe has lived for many years.135  But the Eastern Shoshone Tribe 
also lives on the Wind River Reservation, and they claimed that “[a]llowing 
an enemy tribe the right to kill [their] sacred eagles” would violate their 
religious beliefs.136  The federal government tried to reach a compromise that 
would satisfy the religious beliefs of both tribes: it granted a permit allowing 
the Northern Arapaho Tribe to take two bald eagles outside the 
 
 128  764 F.3d at 479.   
 129  Id.   
 130  Press Release, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Native Americans Win, Feds 
Flee Feather Fight: Government Surrenders Sacred Feathers; Admits Undercover Powwow 
Raid Was Illegal (June 14, 2016), http://www.becketlaw.org/media/native-americans-win-
feds-flee-feather-fight/; Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, 
No. 7:07-cv-060 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2016), http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Exhibit-1-
Settlement-Agreement-file-stamped.pdf. Co-author Goodrich was counsel for the plaintiffs in 
McAllen.   
 131  Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013), vacated as moot, 822 F.3d 
1151 (10th Cir. 2016).   
 132  947 F. Supp. 2d. at 1209–22.   
 133  822 F.3d 1151.   
 134  N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015).   
 135  Id. at 1164.   
 136  Id. at 1166.   
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reservation.137  But the Northern Arapaho Tribe sued under RFRA and the 
Free Exercise Clause, claiming that their religious beliefs required them to 
take the eagles from within the reservation.138 
The district court rejected the RFRA claim at an early stage of the case, 
relying on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wilgus.139  But then, in a highly 
unusual twist, it ruled in the tribe’s favor under the Free Exercise Clause, 
citing the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Hobby Lobby and Holt, 
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McAllen.140  The court held that the 
government’s action was “facially discriminatory because [it] burdened the 
Northern Arapaho Tribe’s culture and religion based on the cultural or 
religious objection of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe.”141  And it held that the 
action failed strict scrutiny, because “[t]he asserted harm to the culture and 
religion of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe . . . is miniscule.”142  The court did 
not explain why it chose to resolve the case on free exercise grounds, rather 
than revisiting its RFRA decision in light of intervening precedent.  That 
makes this one of the very rare cases to rule against a RFRA claim on the 
merits but in favor of a free exercise claim based on the same facts.143 
This decision is likely best understood as a RFRA decision in free 
exercise clothing.  Although the court said it was avoiding RFRA’s 
“substantial burden” inquiry,144 it based its decision primarily on Hobby 
Lobby and Holt, which are RFRA and RLUIPA cases, respectively—not free 
exercise cases.  And the court’s free exercise analysis focused on the fact 
that the government had “burdened the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s culture 
and religion”145—which sounds more like an analysis of a RFRA claim than 
a free exercise claim. 
A final takeaway on free exercise claims is that they are rare and hard 
to win.  Of the 23 Free Exercise claims raised, the courts reached the merits 
in only 10.146  Of the 10 decisions where the court addressed the merits, 
 
 137  Id. at 1164.   
 138  Id. at 1167.   
 139  N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (D. Wyo. 2012) (discussing 
Wilgus).   
 140  92 F. Supp. 3d at 1180–90.   
 141  Id. at 1179.   
 142  Id. at 1187.   
 143  The only similar cases we are aware of are Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 
n.2 (D. Neb. 1996) and Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, Pa., 35 F.3d 846, 849–50 (3d Cir. 
1994).   
 144  92 F. Supp. 3d at 1182 (“[The Court] need not consider whether Defendants’ final 
agency action placed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.”)   
 145  Id. at 1179 (emphasis added).   
 146  This is in part because free exercise claims are often brought in conjunction with 
RFRA claims (10 times in our data set), and if a RFRA claim is successful, the court typically 
does not reach the free exercise claim.  Free exercise claims were also brought in conjunction 
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plaintiffs were successful only twice.  Even then, one of the two was vacated 
as moot, and the other is better viewed as a RFRA claim.  The paucity of 
successful free exercise claims is probably explained in part by the fact that 
RFRA provides a broad statutory remedy that must be decided before any 
free exercise claim when the federal government is the defendant, in part by 
the fact that free exercise claims involve difficult threshold questions about 
when a law is “neutral” or “generally applicable,” and in part by the fact that 
courts remain hesitant to apply the Free Exercise Clause vigorously in the 
wake of Employment Division v. Smith.147 
F. Establishment Clause 
There were three successful Establishment Clause decisions in two 
different cases—one involving an unusual challenge to a sharia ban,148 and 
the other involving a run-of-the-mill challenge to a Ten Commandments 
display.149 
The sharia ban was a proposed constitutional amendment in Oklahoma.  
The amendment would have prohibited Oklahoma courts from relying on 
“the legal precepts of other nations or cultures,” “[s]pecifically, . . . 
international law or Sharia Law.”150  So, for example, if a private arbitration 
agreement between Muslims incorporated elements of Islamic law, it could 
not be enforced in court; but if a private arbitration agreement between 
Christians or Jews incorporated elements of biblical or Jewish law, it 
could.151 
The amendment was challenged by several Muslims under both the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  Following the Tenth Circuit’s 
reasoning from an earlier decision in the case,152 the district court resolved 
the case by applying what it called the “Larson test” under the Establishment 
 
with claims under the Establishment Clause (11 times), Free Speech Clause (11 times), Equal 
Protection Clause (6 times), and freedom of association (4 times).   
 147  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  See, e.g., Amy Adamczyk, John Wibraniec 
& Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and 
RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 250 Table 1 (2004) (finding that the success rate of free 
exercise claims dropped from 39.5% to 28.4% after Smith, and that the number of claims 
dropped from 310 decided in the nine-and-a-quarter years before the decision to 38 in the 
three-and-a-half years after); but see Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally 
Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2016).   
 148  Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013).   
 149  Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014), aff’d, 841 F.3d 848 
(10th Cir. 2016).   
 150  966 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–01.   
 151  See Luke W. Goodrich, Sharia Across the Pond, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2009, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/06/sharia-courts-us-islam.   
 152  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).   
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Clause.153  Under this test, the amendment was subject to strict scrutiny 
because it made “‘explicit and deliberate distinctions’ among religions.”154  
And the court held that the amendment failed strict scrutiny because the state 
failed to identify “any actual problem the challenged amendment seeks to 
solve.”155  Having decided that the amendment violated the Establishment 
Clause, the court declined to address the merits of the claim under the Free 
Exercise Clause.156 
This decision is interesting not for the result—which is likely correct—
but for its reliance on the Establishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise 
Clause.  By singling out “Sharia Law,” the text of the amendment singled 
out one religion, Islam, for unfavorable treatment.  Such singling out is 
ordinarily treated as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.157  Yet the court 
relied on the Establishment Clause.  Why? 
There are several possible reasons.  First, it is currently easier to 
establish standing to sue under the Establishment Clause than under other 
provisions of the Constitution.158  Courts often allow plaintiffs to bring 
Establishment Clause claims based on nothing more than “offensive contact” 
with a government policy or symbol with which they disagree.159  Thus, if 
there were any doubts about the plaintiffs’ standing in Awad, that would push 
the court toward relying on the Establishment Clause. 
Second, because the Establishment Clause is a structural restraint on 
government power, remedies for a violation of the Establishment Clause tend 
to be broader than for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.160  If a 
 
 153  966 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.   
 154  Id.   
 155  Id. at 1203–04.   
 156  Id. at 1202 n.1.   
 157  See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019, 
2024 (2017) (“[T]arget[ing] the religious for special disabilities based on their religious 
status” is a violation of “the Free Exercise Clause.” (citation omitted)); Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 541–42 (1993) (stating that an 
“attempt to disfavor [a] religion” violates the Free Exercise Clause, while “governmental 
efforts to benefit religion or particular religions” typically violate the Establishment Clause); 
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Souter, J., 
plurality opinion) (applying Establishment Clause where religious group was vested with 
civic power but noting that if the group had instead been “denied” “the rights of citizens 
simply because of [its] religious affiliations,” that would be a “free exercise” case); see also 
Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original 
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1800 (2006) 
(When “restrictions on minority faiths are [not] part of any effort to establish some other 
religion, . . . such restrictions are . . . treated as a free exercise issue.”).   
 158  See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of 
Petitioners, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (No. 08-472) (arguing that the standing in 
Establishment Clause cases should be similar to standing in Equal Protection Clause cases).   
 159  See id. (collecting examples).   
 160  See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of 
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government action violates the Establishment Clause, it will often be struck 
down in its entirety.  But if an action violates the Free Exercise Clause, the 
remedy may be merely an injunction protecting the specific religious 
claimant.161 
Third, since the Supreme Court narrowed the application of the Free 
Exercise Clause in Smith,162 lower courts have been hesitant to invalidate 
government actions under the Free Exercise Clause.163  By contrast, the legal 
standards under the Establishment Clause are notoriously malleable,164 
making the Establishment Clause a more flexible vehicle for resolving 
contested claims. 
Interestingly, this dynamic in Awad arose again in litigation over 
Executive Order No. 13780—commonly known as President Trump’s 
“travel ban”—which suspended entry to the United States by certain foreign 
nationals from six Muslim-majority countries.165  In Trump v. International 
Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), the plaintiffs argued that the Executive 
Order was in fact a “Muslim ban” that singled out Muslims for disfavored 
treatment.166  But the plaintiffs did not bring a claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause; instead, they relied on the Establishment Clause.167  This is likely for 
the same reasons described above: the Establishment Clause may have 
helped them skirt difficult questions of standing; the Establishment Clause 
may have allowed them to strike down the Executive Order in its entirety, 
rather than obtain an injunction limited to the plaintiffs; and some courts may 
have been more receptive to a claim under the Establishment Clause than 
under the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 
 
Neither Party, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 
17, 2017) [hereinafter Becket IRAP Amicus Brief].   
 161  See id.   
 162  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).   
 163  See supra note 147.   
 164  See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. 687 F.3d 840, 869–77 (Easterbook, J. & Posner, 
C.J., dissenting from en banc decision) (calling Lemon and “no endorsement” tests 
“hopelessly open-ended”); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial 
Schools—An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation 
of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1986).   
 165  Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).  The travel ban has since 
been modified by a Presidential Proclamation, which includes new restrictions on Venezuela, 
North Korea, and Chad, and eliminates restriction on Sudan.  See Presidential Proclamation 
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United 
States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sep. 24, 2017).   
 166  See Brief in Opposition, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436 (U.S. 
June 12, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/16-1436-Trump-v.-
Int27l-Refugee-Assistance-BIO.pdf.   
 167  See id.   
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But the plaintiffs in IRAP also attempted to go one significant step 
beyond Awad.  In Awad, the court applied the “Larson test,” which requires 
strict scrutiny whenever a law discriminates among religions.168  But in 
IRAP, the plaintiffs invoked the “Lemon test,” which invalidates a law 
automatically if it has a religious purpose.169  In other words, the government 
gets no opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny.  That was particularly important 
in IRAP, because the government claimed that the Executive Order was 
justified by weighty national security interests.170  But because the lower 
courts applied the Lemon test, they enjoined the Executive Order without 
ever weighing the government’s alleged interest.171 
Both Awad and IRAP were wrong to view the challenged laws 
exclusively through the lens of the Establishment Clause.  That does not 
mean that they reached the wrong result.  But a claim that the government is 
targeting one religious group for disfavor—rather than giving other religious 
groups preferential treatment—is most naturally viewed through the lens of 
the Free Exercise Clause.172  The Free Exercise Clause allows the courts to 
consider the concrete harms to the specific plaintiffs.173  It gives the courts 
well-established tools to ferret out hostility toward religion, rather than 
relying on the subjective Lemon test.174  It allows the courts to craft a remedy 
that addresses specific harms.  And it allows the courts to balance competing 
governmental interests.175 
 
 168  Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (W.D. Okla. 2013).   
 169  See id. (despite invoking the Lemon test, plaintiffs never mention or cite Lemon).   
 170  See Brief for the Petitioners, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project at 9–10, 45, 
Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S. Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content
/uploads/2017/08/16-1436-ts.pdf.  
 171  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), as amended (May 
31, 2017), as amended (June 15, 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).   
 172  See Becket IRAP Amicus Brief, supra note 160.   
 173  See id. at 28–31.   
 174  See id. at 21–25 (Lukumi offers seven ways that a plaintiff can prove that a law is not 
neutral or generally applicable with respect to religion: (1) facially targeting religion; (2) 
resulting in a religious gerrymander in its real operation; (3) failing to apply to analogous 
secular conduct; (4) giving the government open-ended discretion to make individualized 
exemptions; (5) being selectively enforced; (6) having its historical background show that the 
lawmaker’s purpose was to discriminate based on religion; and (7) discriminating between 
religions).   
 175  See id. at 25–28.  It is also better to understand Larson as a case arising under both the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  The plaintiffs in Larson invoked both clauses.  
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 233 (1982).  So did the Supreme Court, stating that “[t]h[e] 
constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the 
continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.”  Id. at 245.  And the Court applied strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 246.  Thus, at least one decision in the Tenth Circuit has noted that Larson is 
supported by both clauses.  Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257–58 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.) (“[D]iscrimination [among religions] is forbidden by the Free 
Exercise Clause as well. [citing Larson] . . . So while the Establishment Clause frames much 
of our inquiry, the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection Clause 
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The other successful Establishment Clause decision in our data set 
involved a challenge to a Ten Commandments display.  In Felix, a city in 
New Mexico installed a Ten Commandments monument—along with 
monuments to the Gettysburg Address, Declaration of Independence, and 
Bill of Rights—on the City Hall Lawn.176  City residents challenged the Ten 
Commandments monument as a violation of the Establishment Clause, and 
the Tenth Circuit agreed.177  Applying the Lemon test, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the text of the monument (taken from the King James Bible), the location 
of the monument in front of city hall, the installation of the monument at a 
religious ceremony, and the fact that the monument immediately prompted 
litigation all contributed to a finding that the government had “endorsed” 
religion.178  This “taint of [government] endorsement” was not cured by the 
fact that the monument was created and donated by a private party, was 
accompanied by several secular monuments, and was accompanied by a sign 
disclaiming any government endorsement of religion.179 
The result in Felix is not uncommon.  Lower courts have struggled for 
years to apply the Lemon test in any consistent and objective fashion.  That 
test has been widely criticized by the lower courts,180 commentators,181 and 
Supreme Court Justices alike182 as largely subjective, allowing courts to 
 
proceed along similar lines.”).   
 176  Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016).   
 177  Id. at 851.   
 178  Id. at 857–59.   
 179  Id. at 860–64.   
 180  See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869–78 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(Easterbook, J. & Posner, J., dissenting from en banc decision) (calling Lemon and “no 
endorsement” test “hopelessly open-ended”); Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 574 
F.3d 1235, 1235 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(noting that “[w]hether Lemon . . . and its progeny actually create discernable ‘tests,’ rather 
than a mere ad hoc patchwork, is debatable” and describing the “judicial morass resulting 
from the Supreme Court’s opinions”); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“Confounded by the ten individual opinions in [McCreary and Van Orden] . . . courts 
have described the current state of the law as both ‘Establishment Clause purgatory’ and 
‘Limbo’” (citations omitted)); id. at 1023–24 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) 
(applauding the majority’s “heroic attempt to create a new world of useful principle out of the 
Supreme Court’s dark materials” and lamenting “[t]he still stalking Lemon test and the other 
tests and factors, which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean from time to time,” as 
“so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not become more 
fathomable”).   
 181  See, e.g., Choper, supra note 164; McConnell, supra note 164.   
 182  See, e.g., Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2284 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calling the endorsement test “antiquated”); Mount 
Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 567 U.S. 944, 944 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence is undoubtedly in need of clarity”); Utah 
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13-21 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence [is] in shambles,” 
“nebulous,” “erratic,” “no principled basis,” “Establishment Clause purgatory,” 
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reach virtually any result.  Thus, it would have been just as easy to write an 
opinion saying that the Ten Commandments monument did not endorse 
religion because it was donated by a private party, accompanied by secular 
monuments, and attended by a disclaimer.183 
The more interesting aspect of Felix is the dissent from denial of 
rehearing en banc by Judges Kelly and Tymkovich, who proposed an 
alternative method of resolving Establishment Clause cases.184  They noted 
that the Supreme Court’s two most recent Establishment Clause decisions 
have moved away from the subjective Lemon test and have instead embraced 
a historical approach.185  Specifically, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, which 
involved a challenge to legislative prayer, the Court held that “the 
Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical 
practices and understandings.’”186  And in Van Orden v. Perry, which 
involved a Ten Commandments monument, the Supreme Court specifically 
avoided relying on Lemon and instead said that its analysis was “driven both 
by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”187 
To flesh out this historical approach, Judges Kelly and Tymkovich 
drew on the scholarship of former Tenth Circuit judge Michael McConnell, 
who has written that an “establishment” at the time of the founding consisted 
of several recognized features: “(1) [state] control over doctrine, governance, 
and personnel of the church; (2) compulsory church attendance; (3) financial 
 
“impenetrable,” “ad hoc patchwork,” “limbo,” “incapable of consistent application,” “our 
mess,” “little more than intuition and a tape measure,”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing the 
Lemon test to a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
644 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by White, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting); Allegheny Cty. v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–57 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346–49 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107–13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 90–91 
(White, J., dissenting).   
  In recent cases, the Supreme Court has treated the Lemon factors as “no more than 
helpful signposts,” if it has applied them at all.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) 
(plurality opinion); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (not 
applying Lemon); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (same); Good News Club 
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (same).   
 183  See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“When everything matters, when nothing is dispositive, when 
we must juggle incommensurable factors, a judge can do little but announce his gestalt.”).   
 184  Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of 
rehearing en banc).   
 185  Id. at 1219.   
 186  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.   
 187  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 686; see also id. at 699–700 (Breyer, J., concurring); 
Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery 
of History, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71 (2014).   
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support; (4) prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of church 
institutions for public functions; and (6) restriction of political participation 
to members of the established church.”188  Because the City’s actions in Felix 
“met none of the traditional elements of . . . the original public meaning of 
‘establishment,’” Judges Kelly and Tymkovich concluded that the City’s 
actions should not be construed as an establishment of religion.189 
This type of historical analysis seems likely to become the prevailing 
method of resolving Establishment Clause claims.  The Lemon test is now 
on its last legs;190 it has been criticized by a majority of recent Justices, and 
the Court has studiously avoided applying it in recent cases.191  The Court 
has increasingly relied on a historical approach to interpret the other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the Second,192 Fourth,193 and 
Sixth194 Amendments, as well as the First Amendment itself.195  Its most 
recent Establishment Clause case held that “the Establishment Clause must 
be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings.’”196  
Thus, it seems like only a matter of time before the Court makes clear that 
this sort of historical approach should guide interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
This will be a welcome development.  A historical approach will place 
the interpretation of the Establishment Clause on a far more objective basis 
than under the Lemon test.  It will connect the interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause to the motivating concerns of the founders—namely, 
coercion and control of religion.197  And it will reduce unnecessary division 
 
 188  847 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and 
Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2105, 2131 (2003)).   
 189  Id. at 1221; see also Rassbach, supra note 187, at 92 (proposing a similar approach).   
 190  Rassbach, supra note 187, at 90.   
 191  See supra note 182.   
 192  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–97 (2008) (examining the meaning 
of the Second Amendment “at the time of the founding”).   
 193  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 & n.3 (2012) (examining the “original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment” because “we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”).   
 194  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (examining “the practice of 
criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years 
surrounding our Nation’s founding”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) 
(examining “the historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its 
meaning”).   
 195  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 
(2012) (applying historical analysis to determine the existence and scope of the First 
Amendment ministerial exception).   
 196  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).   
 197  See McConnell, supra note 188, at 2131; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost 
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).   
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over many of the less significant matters of religious expression that have 
come to fill the courts’ Establishment Clause docket.198 
G. Title VII 
In Title VII cases, there were five favorable decisions.  All five were 
“partial” victories—where the plaintiff merely survived a motion to dismiss 
or motion for summary judgment.  Three of the five involved EEOC 
enforcement actions to protect Muslims.199  One involved a religious 
discrimination claim by Mormons—the only case in our data set that was 
brought by Mormon plaintiffs.200  The last case involved an employee 
allegedly fired by the Kansas government for not attending church.201  
It seems noteworthy that three of the five successful Title VII decisions 
involved Muslims, given that Muslims constitute less than 1% of the Tenth 
Circuit population.  Surveying lower federal courts between 1996–2005, 
Sisk and Heise found that the most common religious liberty claims brought 
by Muslims, aside from prisoner claims, were employment discrimination 
cases against the federal government.202  However, they also found that 
Muslim claimants were nearly twice as likely to lose than non-Muslim 
claimants.203  But unlike Sisk and Heise, our data set includes cases brought 
against private employers.  And all three successful Muslim claims involved 
EEOC enforcement actions.  Thus, our findings may speak less to the overall 
success rates of Muslim claimants and more to the possibility of increased 
enforcement of Title VII by EEOC on behalf of Muslims.204 
 
 198  Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting) (noting that Establishment Clause cases often “require[e] scrutiny more 
commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary”).   
 199  EEOC v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.N.M. 2013); EEOC v. 
JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2015); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., 
Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015).   
 200  Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013).   
 201  Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Kan. 2016).  
In a later decision in that case, the jury rejected the employee’s religious discrimination claim, 
resulting in a loss for the religious claimant.  See Fired Employee Loses Religious 
Discrimination Suit Against Kansas Secretary of State, RELIGION CLAUSE (Aug. 25, 2017), 
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2017/08/fired-employee-loses-religious.html.   
 202  Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 249.   
 203  Id.   
 204  In the wake of 9/11, “the EEOC saw a 250% increase in the number of religion-based 
discrimination charges involving Muslims,” and although the uptick related to 9/11 decreased, 
the EEOC continues to see an increase in charges involving religious discrimination against 
Muslims.  U.S. EEOC, What You Should Know About the EEOC and Religious and National 
Origin Discrimination Involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian 
Communities, https://www.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/wysk/religion_national_origin_9-11.cf
m (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).  The EEOC reports that it has filed “nearly 90 lawsuits alleging 
religious and national origin discrimination involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern 
and South Asian communities.”  Id.  Specifically, from 2009 until late October 2015, there 
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H. Prisoner and Asylum Cases 
For most of our analysis, we have excluded claims brought by prisoners 
and asylum seekers.  But a few more observations on those claims are in 
order. 
Of the 39 prisoner decisions in our data set, 15 (38%) were decided on 
purely procedural grounds.  This is double the rate of purely procedural 
decisions in non-prisoner and non-asylum cases (19%).  But that is not 
surprising, given that 87% of prisoner cases were pro se. 
Of the 24 decisions that addressed the merits, 6 were successful205—
producing a success rate of 25%.  Like the Title VII cases, all of the 
successful decisions involved “partial” success—i.e., rulings that the 
plaintiff survived summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.  The 6 
successful decisions involved 5 RLUIPA claims, 3 free exercise claims, and 
1 equal protection claim.  (There are more successful claims than decisions, 
because some successful decisions involved multiple successful claims.) 
The 25% success rate for prisoner decisions is surprisingly high.  It is 
more than half the success rate of non-prisoner and non-asylum decisions 
(44%), and it approaches the success rate in those cases when the 
contraception mandate decisions are excluded (35%).  This is especially 
surprising given that 87% of prisoner decisions involved pro se plaintiffs 
(including 5 of 6 successful decisions), compared with only 10% of non-
prisoner and non-asylum decisions. 
But two factors should temper this surprise.  First, none of the 6 
successful decisions involved complete success; they were merely rulings 
that the plaintiff survived summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.  
Second, 37 of the 39 prisoner decisions came from the Tenth Circuit, while 
only 2 came from district courts.206  That is because our data set excludes 
unreported district court decisions, and district courts resolve most pro se 
 
were 54 cases in which the EEOC brought religious accommodation lawsuits on behalf of 
employees.  Eugene Volokh, The EEOC, Religious Accommodation Claims, and Muslims, 
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2016).  Of those, 14 (26%) were brought on 
behalf of Muslim employees, 6 (11%) on behalf of Seventh-day Adventists, 6 (11%) on behalf 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 1 (2%) on behalf of a class including both Muslims and non-
Muslims.  Id.  The rest were brought on behalf of members of various other religious groups.  
Id.   
 205  See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); Robertson v. 
Biby, 647 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x 
692 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA and free exercise); Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813 
(10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA, free exercise, and equal protection); Marshall v. Wyo. Dep’t of 
Corr., 592 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2014) (free exercise); McKinley v. Maddox, 493 F. App’x 
928 (10th Cir. 2012) (free exercise).   
 206  See Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) (claim survived 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D. Wyo. 
2014) (plaintiff’s preliminary injunction denied on RLUIPA and free exercise claims).   
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prisoner cases via unreported decisions.  Thus, our data set excludes a 
substantial number of unsuccessful prisoner decisions, which would 
significantly reduce the success rate.  That said, an interesting line of future 
research would be to develop a data set that enables comparison of the 
success rates of prisoner claims compared with other types of religious 
freedom claims.  Particularly since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Holt207—ruling unanimously in favor of a Muslim prisoner’s RLUIPA 
claim—the success rates in prisoner cases may rise. 
Of the 20 asylum decisions, only 1 resulted in even partial success—a 
remand to the BIA to consider a claim it had failed to address.208  This is 
likely due to the high level of deference given to the BIA.209 
I. Cases Involving a Dissent 
Lastly, in addition to considering successful religious liberty claims, we 
wanted to explore the decisions that were most divisive—namely, those that 
generated dissent. 
Of the 23 Tenth Circuit decisions in non-prisoner, non-asylum cases, 6 
(26%) involved at least one dissent.210  This rate of dissent is more than ten 
times higher than the rate of dissent in Tenth Circuit cases generally 
(2.4%)211—suggesting that religious liberty claims proved to be difficult.  
However, this number is also affected by the spate of contraception mandate 
cases, which generated 3 of the 6 dissents.212  Absent the contraception 
mandate cases, the rate of dissent was more modest but still over six times 
the average—at 15%. 
 
 
 
 207  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015).   
 208  Li v. Holder, 607 F. App’x 818, 825 (10th Cir. 2015) (remanding to the BIA to 
consider claim based on fear of future religious persecution).   
 209  See Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (detailing deferential standard 
of review).   
 210  Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of 
rehearing en banc); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 
2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015) (panel 
decision); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 
2015) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc); Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139 
(10th Cir. 2013).   
 211  To calculate this rate, we first searched all Tenth Circuit decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-
24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), yielding 6,131 cases.  We then searched all Tenth Circuit 
decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017) & DIS(dissent!), yielding 148 cases. 
148/6,131=0.024 or 2.4%.   
 212  See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (en banc); Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d 1151 
(panel decision); Little Sisters of the Poor, 799 F.3d 1315 (dissent from denial of rehearing 
en banc).   
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The six decisions involving dissents came in five cases.  Three of these 
we have already discussed: Felix (Ten Commandments),213 Hobby Lobby 
(contraception mandate),214 and Little Sisters of the Poor (contraception 
mandate).215  The fourth was EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
which involved a Title VII employment discrimination claim brought by a 
Muslim job applicant.216  And the fifth was Cressman v. Thompson, which 
involved a claim of compelled speech.217 
Notably, three of these five cases (Little Sisters of the Poor, Hobby 
Lobby, and Abercrombie) were eventually heard on the merits by the 
Supreme Court.218  All three were resolved in favor of the religious 
claimant—with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Hobby Lobby affirmed, its 
ruling in Abercrombie reversed, and its ruling in Little Sisters of the Poor 
vacated. 
Ultimately, despite the small sample size, these results suggest that 
religious liberty cases tend to present some of the more difficult and divisive 
issues confronting the federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is no secret that religious liberty can be a divisive issue.  Precisely 
because of that, discussions about the issue should be informed by concrete 
data.  Although it can be tempting to build a narrative about religious liberty 
based on a small number of high profile cases—such as Hobby Lobby and 
Little Sisters of the Poor—those cases are not the whole story.  The whole 
story is more complex—and more interesting.  It is a story of prisoners and 
asylum seekers, employees and Ten Commandments monuments, Muslims 
and nonbelievers.  It is a story of a relatively small number of cases, brought 
predominantly on behalf of non-Christian religious minorities, meeting 
limited success. 
Our empirical study raises a number of interesting questions.  For 
example, why are there so few cases?  Is it because our society already does 
a good job of protecting religious liberty?  Or is it because certain types of 
religious claims are so difficult to win?  Similarly, why are non-Christian 
religious minorities bringing a disproportionate share of cases?  Are they 
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more likely to sue?  Or are they more likely to suffer a violation of their 
religious liberty?  And finally, what caused the anomalous spate of cases 
challenging the contraception mandate?  Was it a new kind of litigiousness 
by Christians?  Or was it a new kind of overreach by the federal government? 
Our study does not answer these questions.  But it does place them in a 
more informed context.  It suggests that Hobby Lobby, while important, was 
not a turning point in religious liberty litigation.  It has not prompted a flood 
of new litigation by Christians or for-profit corporations.  If anything, its 
main effect has been to provide more protection for religious minorities like 
the Native Americans who won the right to use eagle feathers in McAllen, or 
the Muslim prisoner who won the right to grow a beard in Holt.  These 
religious minorities were the main religious liberty claimants before Hobby 
Lobby, and they remain the main religious liberty claimants afterwards.  
Ironically, then, the main beneficiaries of the win for Christian claimants in 
Hobby Lobby may be non-Christian religious minorities. 
 
